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Essays on Corporate Finance 
Chapter 1: 
Policy Sensitive Firms and Market Value in China 
Sili Zhou 
Abstract: Economic Policy uncertainty under political opaqueness imposes great 
impact in the capital market. I construct ex ante cross-section of firm sensitivity to 
China Economic Policy Uncertainty (CEPU) index from Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2013). This measure of policy sensitivity is significantly negatively predictive of 
a firm’s market value and Tobin’s Q. Cross sectional tests show that the negative 
effects are stronger in SOEs, for firms with higher agency problems, and for firms 
operating in market with lower degree of competition or market disciplining. The 
evidence suggests that high level of policy influence causes significant value 
destruction in the capital market.  
 
Chapter 2: 
Export, Ownership and Innovation: Evidence from China 
Xiaping Cao, Shuyu Xue, Sili Zhou 
Abstract: We provide micro-firm evidence how global trade promotes corporate 
innovation in China. Firms with high level of foreign export innovate more than 
firms relying on domestic sales. The difference in patents for firms with high vs. 
low level of foreign exports is significant in magnitude and increases drastically 
 
 
over time. Such difference is more pronounced in non-SOE subsample. A battery 
of endogeneity tests including RMB policy change or bilateral treaties show that 
export has a causality effect on innovations. Within industries evidence suggests 
that Chinese multinationals catch up on patents where US peers retreat. Firms 
with export enjoy technology spill-over from US innovation in low-tech industries 
but not high tech. Our research suggests that global export improves technology 
spill-over Chinese multinationals especially non-SOEs and low-tech firms. 
 
Chapter 3: 
Trade Credit, Ownership and Informal Financing in China 
Xiaping Cao, Sili Zhou 
Abstract: We investigate informal financing such as accounts receivable and 
payable of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China. The volume 
of informal financing dramatically increased and non-SOEs significantly more 
rely on them than SOEs. SOEs with abundance of liquidity or during financial 
crisis are able to provide informal financing to non-SOEs. Fast growing firms do 
not seem to rely more on informal financing. Our research highlights the 
importance of informal financing and ownership structures in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 1: 
Policy Sensitive Firms and Market 
Value in China 
 
Sili ZHOU* 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic Policy uncertainty under political opaqueness imposes great impact in 
the capital market. I construct ex ante cross-section of firm sensitivity to China 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (CEPU) index from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013). 
This measure of policy sensitivity is significantly negatively predictive of a firm’s 
market value and Tobin’s Q. Cross sectional tests show that the negative effects 
are stronger in SOEs, for firms with higher agency problems, and for firms 
operating in market with lower degree of competition or market disciplining. The 
evidence suggests that high level of policy influence causes significant value 
destruction in the capital market.  
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1.1. Introduction 
Changes in government’s economic policies on fiscal, regulatory and 
monetary issues present an important source of policy uncertainty that casts great 
impacts on financial markets. However, the theoretical and empirical literatures 
about how the uncertainty on economic policy affects corporation’s value offer 
contradictory predictions. The irreversible investment suggests that it is optimal 
for firms to defer their investment since the uncertainty increases the opportunity 
cost to wait and decreases value of firm (Bernanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel 
(1986), Pindyck (1991), Abel and Eberly (1994), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Bulan 
(2005), Bloom et al. (2007), Bloom (2009)). On the other hand, there are other 
papers that the option to wait is less valuable thus uncertainty increases 
investment (Carballero (1991), Grenadier (2002), Weeds (2002), Abel et al. (1996), 
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983)).  Recently, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
empirically construct an index of aggregate policy uncertainty as a weighted 
average of three different components
1
. This index captures great policy 
uncertainty periods such as debt-ceiling crisis and presidential election, as 
investors require high compensation to bear undiversifiable policy risk (Pastor and 
Veronesi (2013), Brogaard and Detzel (2015), Kelly et al, (2016)). 
In this paper, I employ the China Economic Policy Uncertainty (CEPU) 
index from Baker et al. (2013)
2
 and focus on the impact of CEPU on firm market 
                                                             
1
 The frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty, the number of federal tax code 
provisions set to expire, and the extent of forecaster disagreement over future inflation and government 
purchases.  
2
 To measure economic policy uncertainty for China, Baker, Bloom, Davis and Wang (2013) construct a 
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value. Chinese capital market is the ideal setting to examine whether a firm’s 
policy association may destroy market value or enhance value. Unlike U.S. setting, 
Chinese government has strong influence on the market through direct channel 
such as changes in fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies. Secondly, many listed 
firms are state owned enterprises (SOEs) and their CEOs are indirectly influenced 
by the government policies and there is more policy uncertainty than private firms 
for the varying in government policies. SOEs by its ownership nature are likely to 
be sensitive to economic policy uncertainty. Non-SOEs on the other hand are also 
greatly sensitive to policy uncertainty, since they have incentives to establish 
policy connections to extract rents and gain favourable treatments from the 
government (Faccio, 2010). 
One of the most challenging parts is to measure how firm policy 
uncertainty. Previous studies have use proxies such as volatility in stock return, 
dispersion in analyst forecasts to measure firm level uncertainty (Bloom et al. 
(2007), Bond and Cummins (2004)) . However, all these measures cannot truly 
capture the firm-specific policy uncertainty. To quantitatively measure the degree 
of policy uncertainty
3
, I propose a new measure of corporate policy sensitivity by 
regression a firm’s prior rolling monthly stock returns on the monthly CEPU using 
a modified CAPM model or Fama and French (1992)'s three factor method. The 
estimated coefficient of CEPU sensitivity provides an ideal score on how a firm 
                                                                                                                                                                       
scaled frequency count of articles about policy-related economic uncertainty in the South China Morning Post 
(SCMP), Hong Kong's leading English-language newspaper. 
3
The economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013) has been widely used in literature. (Pastor and 
Veronesi (2012,2013), Brogaard and Detzel (2015) and Kelly et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2016). 
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react to government policy uncertainty heterogeneously. 
4
 
China stock market is unique. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) find that 
Chinese stocks exhibit abnormally high systematic risk as measured as the 
R-squared in the CAPM model. Their interpretation is that firms’ idiosyncratic 
risk is largely ignored due to synchronous trading behaviour of the investors. I 
modify their model by including the CEPU index in the CAPM model and 
estimate each firm’s policy loadings on CEPU index. I show that firms 
cross-sectional have significant policy loadings on CEPU index, suggesting that 
policy uncertainty is important source of market volatility that is not captured by 
the market beta from CAPM alone. Similarly, I also use Fama and French's three 
factors by including CEPU index and estimate a firm's policy uncertainty loading. 
Chen, Jiang and Tong (2016) investigate the impact of CEPU index on the 
time series variation of Chinese stock market expected return. Their findings 
mainly focus on the negative predictor of CEPU on future stock market turn on 
various investor horizons. Different from their results, my paper put emphasis on 
how policy uncertainty impacts on cross-sectional firm-level market value. I 
hypothesize that high degree of policy association destroys market value since 
investor disagreement is high. Cross-sectional I hypothesize that there exists 
greater value destruction effects for firms that suffer high degree of agency 
problem, such as dual agency problem faced by SOEs. In this paper, I find that 
higher sensitive firms lead firms Tobin Q drop about 2.0% to 3.1% and SOEs 
                                                             
4
This estimation measure is approached by many researchers. (Brogaard and Detzel (2015), Xu(2016), Chen 
et al. (2016), Akey and Lewellen (2015)). 
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dominate the value destruction effect. Similar results are reported when alternative 
measures of firm market value such as current value of Tobin’s Q or logarithm of 
market value is used. The negative effects of policy sensitivity on firm value are 
significantly larger for firms with low leverage, high degree of product market 
competition, high cash flows, and firms operating in market with low market 
index. 
The other big challenge is identification issue. My first identifying 
approach is to disentangle whether the value destruction comes from 
cross-sectional or time-series differences. I use a shock to CEPU index to 
understand the different effect. By construction, the CEPU index is calculated 
from news coverage on Chinese polices. From 2004-2012, a new editor-in-chief 
Wang Xiangwei was in position and he is well known for being less independent 
to cover the uncertainty in South China Moring Post. Indeed, the policy 
uncertainty effect on firm value is more pronounced during 2004 and 2012. This 
confirms firm effect rather than time effect dominates market destroying. The 
second identifying strategy is to use 4 trillion yuan Stimulation Plan by central 
government in 2008 as a plausibly exogenous shock in the sample. Consistent 
with the hypothesis, I find that during the post three-year windows, the value 
destruction effect is more severe than other period. Finally, I used provincial 
leadership turnover of governors as geographic heterogeneously shocks to the 
policy sensitive firms. I argue that the positive (negative) type of turnover play 
opposite direction of firm value and amplify the risk level for those sensitive 
6 
 
firms.  
My paper is the first to point out that firm market value destruction is 
caused by government economic policy uncertainty, which is distinct from the 
channels that have previously documented in political connection literature. There 
is a large literature shows that firm’s political connection adds value. (Roberts 
(1990), Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Ramalho (2007), Li et al. (2008), Khwaja 
and Mian (2005), Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009), Cooper, Gulen and 
Ovtchinnikov (2010), Amore and Bennedsen (2013), Akey (2015)).On the 
contrary, political association may destroy value since connected firms may be 
less disciplined by capital markets and regulations (Berkman, Cole, and Fu 
(2010)), and therefore controlling shareholders of connected firms are more likely 
to retain earnings to expropriate minority shareholders (Qian, Pan, and 
Yeung(2011)). Fan,Wong, and Zhang (2007) shows that political connection 
destroys corporate market value for IPO firms in China. Instead of relying on 
individual director or manager’s previous working experience as politicians or 
bureaucrats, I provide a most direct and generic measure of a firm’s policy 
exposure by relying on market measure of stock’s association with policy or 
CEPU index on monthly basis.  
The paper is organized as flows. Section 2 summarizes the data and 
summary statistics. Section 3 describes the methodology for firm’s sensitivity to 
China Economic Policy Uncertainty. Section 4 represents the main empirical 
results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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1.2. Data Construction and Summary Statistics 
The monthly stock market trading data and monthly market trading data 
are obtained from Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR). The 
sample covers China-incorporated firms that are listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Since class B shares 
are eligible for foreign investors with a discount on A shares (Sun, Tong, 2000), I 
only maintain stock return of class A shares. Those financial firms are excluded 
from my listed since they have different disclosure regulations and their liquidity 
positions are different from other firms. My main variables and firm 
characteristics data are also obtained from CSMAR for the period from 1998 to 
2014. The sample period is chosen to match the availability of cash flow sheet in 
CSMAR database as CSMAR starts to collecting it from year 1998. I drop off 
delisted firms, such as ST or S*T because they have more strict regulation 
requirement by CSRC (China Security Regulation Committee). Considering the 
impact of extreme values and outliers, I winsorize all firm characteristics at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. I also remove firms which have less than three years 
observation. As a result, the whole sample consists of 17,460 firm-year 
observations with 1,483 firms from 1999 to 2014. 
I use a number of control variables suggested by previous literature in the 
Q specification. Appendix A lists the definitions of all key variables used in my 
analysis. Panel A of Table 1 give the summary statistics of key variables used in 
8 
 
this paper. The main dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, defined as the book value of 
total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity scaled by book 
value of total assets. I also use two measurements of Q since the non-tradable 
shares is an important issue in China.
5
 I also employ the natural logarithm of the 
market value (total market value) as an alternative measurement of firm market 
value. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is also 
the natural logarithm of the fiscal year minus the first IPO year.  Cash flow is 
measured as EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus interest expense and 
taxes scaled by lagged total assets. Leverage here is the sum of the short-term 
borrowings plus the long-term debts and divided by the lagged total assets. The 
measurement of  firm-level investment here is the capital expenditures which 
includes the net cash payments from the acquisition of fixed assets, intangible 
assets and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement divided by the 
lagged book value of total assets. 
As for the ownership information for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs, I obtain the ultimate owner of listed firms as well as the largest 
shareholder ownership information from three different sources: WIND, RESSET, 
CSMAR. If their information conflict with each other, I recheck with the firm’s 
official website as well as official news media such as Sina, Souhu etc. to double 
confirm the status of ownership at each year.  
 
                                                             
5
 Chen and Xiong (2002), Bai et al.(2004) discussed the issue of non-tradable shares in China maybe an 
important issue. We obtain other measurement of Tobin’s Q as well and find similar results. 
9 
 
1.3. Sensitivity to China Economic Policy Uncertainty 
My first task is to document how firms differ in their sensitivities to China 
economic policy uncertainty (CEPU). Based on my setting, I try to understand, 
among other things equal, what kinds of firms have a high policy sensitivity to 
CEPU and how sensitive firms various in other observable measurements: 
ownership (SOE v.s. non-SOE), leverage (high leverage v.s. low leverage), market 
competition (high HHI v.s. low HHI), cash flow (high CF v.s. low CF) and 
development of local market (high market index v.s. low market index). To begin 
with, I need to define a new measurement of firm’s policy sensitivity. 
I estimate each firm’s exposure to economic policy uncertainty following 
Brogaard and Detzel (2015), Xu (2016) and use China Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (CEPU) by Baker et. al.(2015) as main measurement of policy 
uncertainty in China. Baker et al construct a monthly scaled frequency of articles 
about policy uncertainty in leading English-language newspaper starting from 
year 1995. 
For each stock and for each month in my sample, I estimate the CEPU 
sensitivity from the monthly rolling regression of excess stock returns on CEPU 
over 60 month window: 
, ,( )
60,...,
CEPU MKT
i t t i t i t t i tR Rf CEPU Rm Rf
t m m
        
 
 
The dependent variable is the monthly stock return with dividends. The 
risk free rate here is the monthly converted deposit and withdraws interest rate. 
10 
 
tCEPU  is the China Economic Policy Uncertainty in month t and 
CEPU
i
measures the sensitivity of firm i to economic polity uncertainty. Rm  is defined 
as the monthly market return with dividends and here I adopted the 
value-weighted return
6
.  
Following Fama and French (1992), I estimate the beta of individual 
stocks using monthly return prior to 60 months if available with minimum of 24 
months. Since the trading regulation (T+1) was introduced only after the year 
1995, I start to use the monthly stock return after that period. Thus, the first 
non-missing CEPU sensitivity starts from December 1999. I obtain December of 
each year as the estimation of firm sensitivity score and combined with the annual 
financial report.  
Following Akey and Lewellen (2015), I define a firm as being policy 
sensitive during the prior 60 months estimation if p-value is less than or equal to 
0.10. I also differentiate a positive-sensitive firm from a negative-sensitive firm 
depending on the positive or negative of sensitivity score.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of sensitivity 
measurement by each year. I would find that roughly 10% of firms would be 
sensitive to CEPU since the p-value cutoff I have defined. Panel B also shows the 
time-series variation in the fraction of firms that sensitive to the CEPU. The most 
sensitive year is 2013, 2008 when a new central government takes over. But the 
                                                             
6
As Chen and Xiong (2002), Bai et al.(2004) point out that non-tradable shares is an important issue in China, 
we consider two different measurements of value weighted market return: Current Value Weighted (CVW) 
market return and Total Value Weighted (TVW) market return.  I also try to use the equalled-weighted 
return as for robustness check and the result is similar. 
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positive-sensitive firm v.s. negative-sensitive is totally different: 27% 
positive-sensitive v.s. 73% negative-sensitive in 2008 and 74% positive sensitive 
v.s. 26% negative-sensitive in 2013. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 plots the geographic distribution of sensitivity percentage (as 
defined as number of sensitive firms to the total number of firms). It shows that 
Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang, ones with least developing areas have higher 
proportion of policy sensitive firms. While the most developing areas such as 
Zhejiang, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu are among the middle position 
of this distribution.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
1.4. Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity 
Having documented that some firms are more sensitive to policy news than 
others, I now turn to answer the question, whether these policy-sensitive firms 
share lower values. Intuitively, policy sensitive firms will be more expropriated by 
politician thus their value should be less than policy-neutral firms. 
I start to examine this channel formally in Table 2 and Table 3, where I 
regress firm market value on a firm’s sensitivity score as well as sensitivity status. 
Specifically, in Table 2, I estimate panel regressions and include four-level 
12 
 
industry
7
 and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered 
at industry level. While in Table 3, I also conduct firm-year level estimation using 
the same procedure. Standard errors are clustered at firm level in Table 3. Tobin Q 
and the natural logarithm of (total) market value are employed as proxies for firm 
market value in both Table 2 and Table 3. 
[Insert Table 2&3 here] 
My interest variables are the firm’s sensitivity score to policy uncertainty 
and the sensitivity dummy here. I find that sensitivity score are all significantly 
negative in all specification. The magnitude of sensitivity score is about -2.01% to 
-3.14%, indicating that each percent increase in sensitivity score in firms generally 
decrease the value of firm by about 2.01% to 3.14% on average. While the natural 
log of (total) market value as dependent variable, the magnitude of sensitivity 
score is about -1.11% to -1.19%
8
. As for the sensitivity dummy variable, the 
sensitive firms generally have -7.1% to 7.5% lower market value than those 
non-sensitive firms.  Meanwhile, the sensitive firms have 3.3% to 3.4% lower in 
the measurement of the natural log of (total) market value. 
I also find that smaller, older firm with more capital investment, lower 
leverage and more cash flow will generate higher Q. Besides, I also find that 
stated owned enterprise will have lower Q, which is consistent with the previous 
literature. All controls are significant except for capital investment in column 1 to 
column 4 when Tobin Q is dependent variable. In Table, I use firm fixed effect 
                                                             
7
 Four level CIS industry are used here. I also try to use different levels of industry classifications and the 
results are still robust. 
8
 The magnitude is calculated like exp(-1.195%)-1 = -1.19%,exp(-1.117%)-1=-1.11%  
13 
 
instead of industry fixed effect and redo the regression. The results are quite 
similar as in Table 2. The sensitivity score are all negative and significant in all 
regression but the magnitude is much smaller. Most controls share the same sign 
as in Table 2 but the significance drops in column 1 to column 2 which may suffer 
from the potential multicollinearity problem when using the firm fixed effect. 
  
1.4.2 Identification 
In this subsection, I first examine the time varying coefficient of sensitivity 
score on firm market value using the Fama-MacBeth(1973) cross-sectional 
regressions. Panel A in Table 4 reports the first step of cross sectional estimation 
for each year. I notice that most of coefficients are negative expect for the year 
2013 and 2014.
9
 Why this happens? Thus, I checked whether the turnover of the 
editor-in-chief of South China Moring Post (SCMP). I find that Wang Xiangwei
10
, 
a former Julin Province Committee, was promoted on February 2012 to be 
editor-in-chief. During his tenure in SCMP, more censorship was conducted and 
the suspicion of independence was raised by other media.
11
 Therefore, I suspect 
that the coefficients of sensitivity on firm value should be varied. But the mean of 
the coefficients is still negative and it is still significant in all specification in 
Panel B in Table 4, consistent with the previous result. 
                                                             
9
 There are some positive coefficient years at the beginning of the sample. But this may become of the 
limited sample and I checked that they are not significant. 
10
 See detailed of the announcement here: 
http://www.campaignasia.com/article/scmp-veteran-wang-xiangwei-steps-up-as-new-editor-in-chief/28883
1 
11
 https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2012/jun/20/press-freedom-china. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
I perform a variety of tests to mitigate the endogeneity issue of my main 
results. Firstly, I use the exogenous shock of November 9, 2008 when Chinese 
central government announced estimated at 4 trillion yuan (about 570 billion U.S. 
dollars) would be spent over the next two years to rescue the economic crisis at 
2007.
12
 Thus, this government spending should have larger effects on high 
sensitive firms to economic policy uncertainty. 
In Table 5, I introduce a dummy variable Simulation to be one if the year is 
within next two years after stimulation plan was announced.  Besides, the 
interaction term of stimulation dummy with sensitivity score is also included to 
capture the difference-in-difference of the post stimulation period v.s. the other 
period. As Table 4 has shown, the interaction terms are all significantly negative 
except for column 3 when log (MV) is dependent variable. Besides, the magnitude 
of interaction terms is much bigger controlling for the level of sensitivity score, 
which implies that value destruction is much stronger during monetary stimulation 
period. Similarly, the coefficient of sensitivity score is all negative and significant 
in all specifications, consistent with previous results. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In Table 6, I adopt another exogenous shock: the turnover of the provincial 
governor. Following Chen et al. (2005) and Li and Zhou (2005), I categorize 
                                                             
12
 China announced the economic-stimulus plan that will loosen credit conditions, cut taxes and embark on 
a massive infrastructure spending program to boost domestic demand to combat the crisis. Deng et al.(2015) 
have shown that the investment  as well as credits of centrally controlled SOEs raises a lot after this 
monetary stimulation. 
15 
 
turnovers into two types: promotion turnover and terminal turnover. The 
promotion turnover is defined as cases when a top provincial leader gets promoted. 
On the other hand, the terminal turnover is defined as cases when a top leader is 
dead, demoted, resigned, or sentenced. I don’t include the parallel-moved turnover 
(normal turnover) since the turnover may not necessarily have the outcome on the 
sensitivity changes on economic policy uncertainty. Thus, the Terminal 
(Promotion) Post Dummy equals to one if two years after a top provincial leader 
get promoted (terminated). As Table 5 shown, the interaction of sensitivity score 
with terminal (promotion) post dummy is significantly negative (positive). This 
result suggests that only negative shocks destroy firm value while the positive 
shocks, on the other hand, increase firm value. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
I am also very interested to whether this kind of value destruction is 
stronger in SOEs or not. Thus I separate the sensitivity score into two parts: the 
interaction of SOE with sensitivity and the interaction of non-SOE with sensitivity 
and redo the regression as Table 2. The status of ultimate ownership is usually not 
time-variant, therefore I use industry fixed effect instead of firm fixed effect. 
From Table 7 we can see that the interaction term is all negative and significant 
for all specification. Specifically, the magnitude of sensitivity with SOE dummy is 
as twice bigger as sensitivity with non-SOE dummy. It suggests that the value 
destruction of policy sensitive firms is dominated by SOEs rather than non-SOEs. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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Overall, the results indicate that more policy sensitive firms in China 
usually lead firm market value drop about 2.0% to 3.1% and the value destruction 
is especially stronger after monetary stimulation plan as well as two years after 
provincial top governor is terminated. Furthermore, SOE firms with more policy 
sensitivity may experience more from the drop of firm value. 
 
1.4.3 Subsample Test 
In this session, I try to explore further about what kind of firms suffer from 
this policy sensitivity channel. Generally, I would divide full sample into two 
subsamples according to one of the firm characteristics: ownership, leverage, 
market competition, cash flow. Besides, I also consider whether the economic 
development of local market affect the channel of policy sensitivity on firm 
performance. Fan and Wang (2012) generate new measurement of market 
development indices in 31 provinces in mainland China based on five main 
components. It is widely used to measure how fast development of the market is 
in the geographical province. And I am interested to compare the cross-section 
difference of market development on how policy sensitivity destroys firm value.  
Table 8 reports the regression results based on SOEs subsample and 
non-SOEs subsample. The coefficient of sensitivity is still negative but only 
significant in SOEs subsample. Besides, the magnitude of sensitivity in SOEs 
subsample is twice as big as that in non-SOEs subsample. This suggests that SOEs 
firms with more sensitive to economic policy uncertainty share lower market 
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value. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 9 separate the sample into firms with low leverage and firms with 
high leverage. I can see that firms with low leverage suffer more from value 
destroying with more sensitive to policy. This supports agency story, which means 
firms with more equity holders (low leverage) severally react more to the policy 
uncertainty than those firms with less equity holders. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In Table 10, I construct Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) ratio by 
squaring the share of each firm sales at the industry level 2 and summing the share. 
Higher HHI usually means that industry exist a monopoly, or duopoly firm and 
lower HHI indicates nearly perfect or highly competitive market. I see that more 
competitive market is, more sensitive firms generate lower Tobin Q or (total) 
market value. While for relative monopoly industry, this relation is still negative 
but not significant. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 11 generates result for firms classified as high cash flow v.s. firms 
with low cash flow. We can see that firms in high cash flow subsample have lower 
firm value if they are more policy sensitive. It suggests that firms with less 
financial constraint dominated this value destruction channel, consistent with the 
agency story. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
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Finally, I employ the market index constructed by Fan and Wang (2012) to 
compare the developed (high market index) with developing (low market index) 
provinces in China. Since they only construct the data to year 2009, I match my 
firm level data with the availability of the market index data. I find that firm in 
those developing provinces suffer more from the value decreasing by more policy 
sensitive firms. Among developed areas like Shanghai, Beijing etc. do not have 
such strong linkage between sensitivity and value destroying. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
In sum, I find that firm’s sensitivity to policy uncertainty on firm value 
decreasing is dominated by SOEs and firms have lower leverage, more market 
competition, higher cash flow, and in less developed market. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
I first construct the cross-section of firms’ sensitivities to China Economic 
Policy Uncertainty (CEPU) by using Fama and French (1992) method. I show that 
firms with high sensitivity score destroy Tobin Q about 2% to 3% and other 
similar results when alternative measures of firm market value is used. I also 
report that firms suffer from high degree of agency problem such as SOEs, firms 
with low leverage, high product competition, high cash flows and firms operation 
in market with low market index, dominates this value destruction. My result is 
the first to document that shareholder devalue the changes in policy changes and 
shed light on the relationship between firms’ policy uncertainty sensitivities and 
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their subsequent value destruction behavior. It has a pronounced policy 
implication and this is an interesting prospective area for future research. 
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Appendix 1.A : Variable Definition and Construction 
Variables  Definition Source 
Sensitivity    
CEPU Index  China Economic Policy Uncertainty index constructed by using 
the policy-related economic uncertainty in the English-language 
newspaper South China Morning Post 
Baker et.al (2015) 
Sensitivity  60-month coefficient estimation of the one month CEPU level in 
the CAPM model when using weighted monthly market return  
CSMAR 
Sensitivity 
Dummy 
 Indicator variable set to one if the p-value of the CEPU Sensitivity 
is below 0.10, otherwise zero. 
CSMAR 
Key Variables    
Tobin’s Qmv  Book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity scaled by book value of total assets. 
CSMAR 
Tobin’s Qtmv  Book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus total 
market value of equity scaled by book value of total assets. 
CSMAR 
MV  Tradable shares outstanding multiply by the close price at the end 
of fiscal year  
CSMAR 
TMV  Total shares outstanding multiply by the close price at the end of 
fiscal year  
CSMAR 
Capex  Capital expenditures divided by beginning-of-year book value of 
total assets where capital expenditures are calculated as cash 
payments from the acquisition of fixed assets, intangible assets 
and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus 
cash receipts from selling these assets, including cash paid for 
operating lease. 
CSMAR 
Size  Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets  CSMAR 
Age  Natural logarithm of the difference between fiscal year and IPO 
year 
CSMAR 
Cash Flow  EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus interest expense 
and taxes scaled by book value of total assets 
CSMAR 
Leverage  Book value of the short-term borrowing plus the long term debts 
scaled by book value of total assets. 
CSMAR 
SOE Dummy  Indicator variable set equal to one if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of listed firms is state-owned, zero otherwise. 
CSMAR,WIND 
and RESSET 
Stimulation 
Plan 
 Dummy variable set to one if year is 2008, 2009, 2010 and zero 
otherwise. The 4 trillion RMB stimulation plan was announced at 
November 2008. 
Hand Collected 
Terminal  
Post 
 Dummy variable set to one if two years after provincial governor 
get terminated and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collected 
Promotion 
Post 
 Dummy variable set to one if two years after provincial governor 
get promoted and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collected 
Market index  Provincial marketization index for economic performance.  Fan et al. (2011) 
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Figure 1.1: Geographic distribution of sensitive firms 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics. 
This table contains summary statistics of key variables in the sample. All variables are calculated 
from the year 1999 to 2014. We drop those firms with less than three years observations. Panel A 
presents summary statistics for the key variables used in the paper and the definition for the 
variables can be found at Appendix. All firm level variables are winsored at 1% to 99%. Panel B 
reports the number and mean sensitivity calculated by using China Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(CEPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) based on my estimation procedure (detail of 
the procedure can be found in the text). I also report the fraction of sensitive firms as well as 
whose sensitivities are positive and negative, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms characteristics   
Variable Obs Mean S. D. Min Max 
 Size 17460 21.590 1.284 11.348 28.509 
 Capex 17453 0.067 0.078 -0.076 0.528 
 Age 17456 2.179 0.530 0.000 3.219 
 SOE dummy 17445 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 
 Leverage 17404 0.247 0.196 0.000 1.358 
 Qtmv 17460 2.394 1.774 0.742 17.587 
 Qmv 17460 1.685 1.325 0.387 14.462 
 Cash flow 16892 0.060 0.068 -0.469 0.300 
 Panel B: sensitivity measurement 
 
Year Obs 
Sensitivit
y Score 
# 
Sensitivity
D 
% 
Sensitivity
D 
% 
Positive 
% 
Negative 
1999 550 -0.84% 52 9.45% 57% 43% 
2000 641 -0.95% 62 9.67% 57% 43% 
2001 722 -0.68% 54 7.48% 60% 40% 
2002 842 -0.70% 69 8.19% 62% 38% 
2003 914 -0.61% 77 8.42% 62% 38% 
2004 978 -0.36% 79 8.08% 57% 43% 
2005 1032 0.46% 112 10.85% 44% 56% 
2006 1116 1.12% 101 9.05% 36% 64% 
2007 1097 1.97% 95 8.66% 32% 68% 
2008 1183 1.88% 167 14.12% 27% 73% 
2009 1299 1.34% 104 8.01% 29% 71% 
2010 1358 0.61% 79 5.82% 41% 59% 
2011 1437 -0.76% 89 6.19% 64% 36% 
2012 1448 -1.08% 197 13.60% 74% 26% 
2013 1446 -1.03% 208 14.38% 74% 26% 
2014 1397 -0.77% 143 10.24% 69% 31% 
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Table 1.2: Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity: Industry Level 
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. The dependent variable in columns (1) – (4) is Tobin Q 
(market value and total market value as denominators respectively) while the dependent variable in 
columns (5) – (8) is the natural logarithm of the amount of market value (total market value). 
Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. 
The Sensitivity Dummy (SensitivityD) is the dummy variable to be one if the p-value of the 
coefficient below 10%, otherwise zero. All specifications control for lagged (current) one year 
firms’ characteristics, which include size, capex, age, SOE dummy, Total leverage and cash flow. 
All specifications include level four industry and year fixed effect. The standard errors are 
clustered at industry level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Qmv Qtmv log(mv) log(tmv) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lag(Sensitivity) -2.012*** 
 
-3.144*** 
 
-1.195*** 
 
-1.117*** 
 
 
(0.321) 
 
(0.434) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.154) 
 lag(SensitivityD) 
 
-0.071*** 
 
-0.075** 
 
-0.033** 
 
-0.034** 
  
(0.027) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
lag(Size) -0.492*** -0.492*** -0.691*** -0.693*** 0.578*** 0.578*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
lag(Capex) 0.024 0.043 0.024 0.053 0.772*** 0.783*** 0.796*** 0.806*** 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.149) (0.149) (0.066) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061) 
Age 0.194*** 0.204*** 0.175*** 0.190*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.017 0.023* 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
SOE -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.021** -0.020** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
lag(Leverage) -0.306*** -0.301*** -0.390*** -0.383*** -0.759*** -0.756*** -0.669*** -0.666*** 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.094) (0.094) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Cash flow 0.823*** 0.839*** 2.437*** 2.463*** 2.848*** 2.858*** 3.250*** 3.259*** 
 
(0.287) (0.289) (0.398) (0.401) (0.093) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) 
Constant 12.647*** 12.664*** 17.322*** 17.344*** 9.498*** 9.507*** 9.747*** 9.755*** 
 
(0.340) (0.341) (0.415) (0.416) (0.146) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147) 
Industry Lv4 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 15240 15240 15240 15240 15240 15240 15240 15240 
adj. R-sq 0.429 0.428 0.438 0.436 0.805 0.805 0.773 0.772 
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Table 1.3: Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity: Firm Level  
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. The dependent variable in columns (1),  (2) is Tobin Q 
(market value and total market value as denominators respectively) while the dependent variable in 
columns (3),  (4) is the natural logarithm of the amount of market value (total market value). 
Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. 
All specifications control for lagged one (current) year firms’ characteristics, which include size, 
capex, age, SOE dummy, Total leverage and cash flow. All specifications include firm and year 
fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3) log(mv) (4) log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) -0.841* -1.684*** -0.587** -0.788*** 
 
(0.430) (0.585) (0.229) (0.218) 
lag(Size) -0.731*** -0.936*** 0.356*** 0.362*** 
 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.019) (0.019) 
lag(Capex) 0.045 -0.105 0.603*** 0.727*** 
 
(0.123) (0.166) (0.074) (0.073) 
Age 0.185* 0.124 0.159** 0.077 
 
(0.111) (0.129) (0.067) (0.057) 
lag(Leverage) 0.061 0.149 -0.446*** -0.315*** 
 
(0.085) (0.119) (0.044) (0.041) 
Cash flow -0.206 0.882** 2.018*** 2.460*** 
 
(0.327) (0.448) (0.104) (0.112) 
Constant 16.537*** 22.908*** 13.250*** 14.248*** 
 
(0.850) (1.031) (0.392) (0.388) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 15253 15253 15253 15253 
adj. R-sq 0.391 0.379 0.816 0.689 
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Table 1.4: Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity: Fama-Macbeth 
Approach 
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach from year 1999 to 2014. Panel A reports the 1
st
 step of 
Fama-MacBeth approach for time-varying coefficient of Sensitivity on Tobin Q (market value and 
total market value as denominators respectively), while Panel B reports the mean of aggregated 
coefficient of all variables from 1
st
 step. Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation of the CEPU 
level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year (current) firms’ 
characteristics, which include size, capex, age, Total leverage and cash flow. All specifications 
include firm fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
1st Step 
(1)Qmv (2)Qtmv 
Panel B: 2nd 
Step 
(1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3) log(mv) (4) log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) lag(Sensitivity) -1.654** -2.266** -0.902** -0.758** 
2000 0.433 -0.223   (0.716) (1.001) (0.375) (0.321) 
2001 -0.721 -1.578 lag(Size) -0.420*** -0.711*** 0.545*** 0.582*** 
2002 0.560 2.813   (0.067) (0.056) (0.022) (0.019) 
2003 -0.243 0.194 lag(Capex) -0.117* -0.275 0.735*** 0.583*** 
2004 -1.134 -2.114   (0.060) (0.353) (0.063) (0.186) 
2005 -1.637 -1.458 Age 0.159*** 0.182*** 0.026* 0.007 
2006 -2.508 -5.214   (0.013) (0.059) (0.013) (0.012) 
2007 -1.597 -4.401 lag(Leverage) -0.124 -0.374* -0.685*** -0.658*** 
2008 -2.135 -3.113   (0.291) (0.189) (0.150) (0.083) 
2009 -9.159 -12.982 Cash flow 0.911** 2.969*** 2.935*** 3.401*** 
2010 -6.406 -8.376   (0.342) (0.220) (0.161) (0.174) 
2011 -6.396 -6.891 Constant 10.315*** 17.180*** 9.435*** 9.320*** 
2012 -3.787 -3.823   (1.755) (1.221) (0.427) (0.489) 
2013 5.175 7.204      
2014 4.749 5.979 Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Mean -1.654 -2.266 N 15253 15253 15253 15253 
N 15 15 adj. R-sq 0.288 0.315 0.585 0.674 
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Table 1.5: Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity: Stimulation Plan  
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. The dependent variable in columns (1),  (2) is Tobin Q 
(market value and total market value as denominators respectively) while the dependent variable in 
columns (3),  (4) is the natural logarithm of the amount of market value (total market value). 
Stimulation is a dummy variable takes to one if year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and zero otherwise. 
Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. 
All specifications control for lagged one year (current) firms’ characteristics, which include size, 
capex, age, SOE dummy, Total leverage and cash flow. All specifications include industry and year 
fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at industry level. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3) log(mv) (4) log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity)*Stimulation -2.787*** -4.053*** -0.255 -0.715** 
 
(0.784) (0.983) (0.362) (0.335) 
Stimulation 0.331*** 0.398*** 0.066*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.059) (0.067) (0.022) (0.021) 
lag(Sensitivity) -1.043*** -1.735*** -1.107*** -0.868*** 
 
(0.335) (0.514) (0.208) (0.185) 
lag(Size) -0.495*** -0.696*** 0.578*** 0.575*** 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) 
lag(Capex) 0.025 0.025 0.772*** 0.796*** 
 
(0.114) (0.149) (0.066) (0.061) 
Age 0.192*** 0.172*** 0.056*** 0.017 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.013) (0.012) 
SOE -0.106*** -0.099*** -0.072*** -0.020** 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.010) (0.009) 
lag(Leverage) -0.302*** -0.384*** -0.758*** -0.668*** 
 
(0.072) (0.093) (0.030) (0.028) 
Cash flow 0.824*** 2.439*** 2.848*** 3.251*** 
 
(0.286) (0.397) (0.093) (0.096) 
Constant 12.724*** 17.435*** 9.505*** 9.766*** 
 
(0.344) (0.421) (0.146) (0.147) 
Industry Lv4 FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 15240 15240 15240 15240 
adj. R-sq 0.430 0.439 0.805 0.773 
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Table 1.6: Firm Performance and Policy Sensitivity: Governor Turnover  
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market 
value and total market value as denominators respectively) Terminal Post is a dummy variable 
takes to one if two years after provincial governor terminated. Promotion Post is a dummy variable 
takes to one if two years after provincial governor promoted. Sensitivity used as the coefficient 
estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged 
one year (current) firms’ characteristics, which include size, capex, age, SOE dummy, Total 
leverage and cash flow. All specifications include level four industry and year fixed effect. The 
standard errors are clustered at industry level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3) Qmv (4) Qtmv 
lag(Sensitivity)*Terminal Post -1.976* -2.283* 
  
 
(1.059) (1.327) 
  Terminal Post -0.012 -0.016 
  
 
(0.025) (0.032) 
  lag(Sensitivity)*Promotion Post 
  
1.389** 1.778** 
   
(0.574) (0.775) 
Promotion Post 
  
-0.021 -0.027 
   
(0.018) (0.023) 
SOE -0.109*** -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.102*** 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024) 
lag(Sensitivity) -1.837*** -2.943*** -2.414*** -3.659*** 
 
(0.328) (0.446) (0.384) (0.520) 
lag(Size) -0.492*** -0.691*** -0.492*** -0.692*** 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) 
lag(Capex) 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 
 
(0.114) (0.149) (0.114) (0.149) 
Age 0.193*** 0.174*** 0.195*** 0.177*** 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) 
lag(Leverage) -0.309*** -0.394*** -0.305*** -0.389*** 
 
(0.072) (0.094) (0.072) (0.094) 
Cash flow 0.823*** 2.437*** 0.819*** 2.433*** 
 
(0.287) (0.398) (0.287) (0.398) 
Constant 12.648*** 17.325*** 12.658*** 17.337*** 
 
(0.341) (0.416) (0.341) (0.416) 
Industry Lv4 FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 15240 15240 15240 15240 
adj. R-sq 0.429 0.438 0.429 0.438 
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Table 1.7: Market Performance and ownership interaction term  
This table presents firm market value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using 
firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market 
value and total market value as denominators respectively) and natural logarithm of the amount of 
market value (total market value). I separate the sensitivity into two subsample group by 
introducing an interaction term with SOE (NONSOE). Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation 
of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year 
(current) firms’ characteristics, which include size, capex, age, SOE dummy, Total leverage and 
cash flow. All specifications include level four industry and year fixed effect. The standard errors 
are clustered at industry level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  (1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3) log(mv) (4) log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity)*SOE -2.718*** -3.998*** -1.603*** -1.549*** 
 
(0.344) (0.495) (0.215) (0.191) 
lag(Sensitivity)*NONSOE -1.125** -2.071*** -0.684*** -0.574** 
 
(0.537) (0.686) (0.246) (0.233) 
SOE -0.107*** -0.101*** -0.071*** -0.019** 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.010) (0.009) 
lag(Size) -0.492*** -0.691*** 0.578*** 0.576*** 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) 
lag(Capex) 0.026 0.026 0.772*** 0.797*** 
 
(0.114) (0.149) (0.066) (0.061) 
Age 0.194*** 0.176*** 0.056*** 0.018 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.013) (0.012) 
lag(Leverage) -0.309*** -0.394*** -0.761*** -0.671*** 
 
(0.072) (0.094) (0.030) (0.028) 
Cash flow 0.824*** 2.439*** 2.849*** 3.251*** 
 
(0.287) (0.398) (0.093) (0.096) 
Constant 12.646*** 17.321*** 9.498*** 9.746*** 
 
(0.340) (0.415) (0.145) (0.147) 
Industry Lv4 FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
N 15240 15240 15240 15240 
adj. R-sq 0.429 0.439 0.806 0.773 
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Table 1.8: Sub-Sample: Ownership 
This table presents ownership subsample tests of firm value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. 
The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market value and total market value as denominators respectively) and natural logarithm of the amount of 
market value (total market value).SOE is a dummy variable takes to one if firm is state owned enterprises. Sensitivity used as the coefficient estimation of the 
CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year (current) firms’ characteristics, which include size, capex, age, total 
leverage and cash flow. All specifications include firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  SOE NONSOE 
  (1)Qmv (2)Qtmv (3)log(mv) (4)log(tmv) (5)Qmv (6)Qtmv (7)log(mv) (8)log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) -1.045** -2.153*** -0.872*** -1.282*** -0.542 -1.118 -0.355 -0.510 
 
(0.436) (0.609) (0.301) (0.263) (0.800) (1.050) (0.349) (0.331) 
lag(Size) -0.468*** -0.610*** 0.368*** 0.386*** -0.902*** -1.178*** 0.326*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.047) (0.057) (0.022) (0.023) (0.064) (0.078) (0.031) (0.027) 
lag(Capex) -0.012 -0.188 0.674*** 0.715*** 0.287 0.135 0.470*** 0.581*** 
 
(0.143) (0.188) (0.103) (0.097) (0.211) (0.279) (0.106) (0.101) 
Age 0.276** 0.252* 0.152* 0.121 0.075 -0.030 0.221** 0.009 
 
(0.119) (0.148) (0.091) (0.075) (0.204) (0.211) (0.100) (0.083) 
lag(Leverage) 0.038 0.013 -0.512*** -0.375*** 0.105 0.461** -0.333*** -0.149** 
 
(0.096) (0.118) (0.060) (0.052) (0.141) (0.209) (0.064) (0.062) 
Cash flow 0.778** 1.690*** 2.389*** 2.692*** -0.906* 0.182 1.656*** 2.012*** 
 
(0.363) (0.530) (0.167) (0.167) (0.468) (0.630) (0.129) (0.141) 
Constant 11.618*** 14.985*** 13.853*** 13.614*** 20.135*** 27.991*** 13.863*** 15.351*** 
 
(1.076) (1.347) (0.537) (0.538) (1.321) (1.596) (0.621) (0.551) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 8815 8815 8815 8815 6425 6425 6425 6425 
adj. R-sq 0.375 0.387 0.816 0.683 0.411 0.398 0.799 0.691 
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Table 1.9: Sub-Sample: Leverage 
This table presents leverage subsample tests of firm value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. 
The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market value and total market value as denominators respectively) and natural logarithm of the amount of 
market value (total market value). High leverage is defined as the leverage ratio higher than median value of all listed firms by each year.  Sensitivity used as 
the coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year (current) firms’ characteristics, 
which include size, capex, age, total leverage and cash flow. All specifications include firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
  High Leverage Low Leverage 
  (1)Qmv (2)Qtmv (3)log(mv) (4)log(tmv) (5)Qmv (6)Qtmv (7)log(mv) (8)log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) -0.004 0.063 -0.394 -0.408 -1.188* -2.474*** -0.734** -1.086*** 
 
(0.437) (0.594) (0.284) (0.287) (0.700) (0.924) (0.336) (0.289) 
lag(Size) -0.501*** -0.720*** 0.340*** 0.303*** -0.878*** -1.061*** 0.366*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.049) (0.061) (0.020) (0.022) (0.068) (0.080) (0.027) (0.023) 
lag(Capex) -0.079 -0.184 0.660*** 0.863*** 0.102 0.234 0.351*** 0.411*** 
 
(0.147) (0.174) (0.089) (0.088) (0.213) (0.301) (0.116) (0.114) 
Age 0.029 -0.093 0.101 0.078 0.287 0.231 0.158* 0.041 
 
(0.127) (0.156) (0.098) (0.079) (0.187) (0.206) (0.090) (0.076) 
lag(Leverage) 0.318*** 0.450*** -0.429*** -0.305*** 0.027 0.165 -0.381*** -0.259*** 
 
(0.105) (0.130) (0.052) (0.049) (0.179) (0.276) (0.073) (0.072) 
Cash flow -0.216 0.429 1.981*** 2.329*** 0.263 1.712** 1.972*** 2.311*** 
 
(0.306) (0.463) (0.123) (0.141) (0.544) (0.745) (0.160) (0.159) 
Constant 11.890*** 18.475*** 13.700*** 15.488*** 19.376*** 25.475*** 12.968*** 13.284*** 
 
(1.026) (1.309) (0.424) (0.455) (1.399) (1.642) (0.558) (0.494) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 7693 7693 7693 7693 7535 7535 7535 7535 
adj. R-sq 0.356 0.387 0.804 0.673 0.414 0.385 0.813 0.704 
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Table 1.10: Sub-Sample: HHI 
This table presents competition subsample tests of firm value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. 
The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market value and total market value as denominators respectively) and natural logarithm of the amount of 
market value (total market value). High HHI is defined as the Herfindahl Index ratio higher than median value of all listed firms by each year. Sensitivity used as 
the coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year (current) firms’ characteristics, 
which include size, capex, age, total leverage and cash flow. All specifications include firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
  High HHI Low HHI 
  (1)Qmv (2)Qtmv (3)log(mv) (4)log(tmv) (5)Qmv (6) Qtmv (7)log(mv) (8)log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) -0.237 -0.657 -0.194 -0.483 -1.158* -2.174*** -0.617** -0.767*** 
 
(0.580) (0.780) (0.294) (0.308) (0.598) (0.777) (0.297) (0.277) 
lag(Size) -0.638*** -0.841*** 0.335*** 0.334*** -0.795*** -1.025*** 0.352*** 0.356*** 
 
(0.059) (0.071) (0.033) (0.032) (0.058) (0.071) (0.020) (0.019) 
lag(Capex) 0.065 0.114 0.627*** 0.701*** 0.039 -0.155 0.435*** 0.625*** 
 
(0.172) (0.241) (0.101) (0.109) (0.181) (0.252) (0.103) (0.099) 
Age 0.282* 0.190 0.261*** 0.088 0.021 -0.048 -0.055 -0.032 
 
(0.148) (0.172) (0.099) (0.087) (0.142) (0.194) (0.085) (0.076) 
lag(Leverage) 0.004 0.021 -0.449*** -0.324*** 0.139 0.256 -0.387*** -0.269*** 
 
(0.117) (0.158) (0.060) (0.057) (0.124) (0.171) (0.057) (0.052) 
Cash flow -0.944* -0.086 1.751*** 2.248*** -0.212 0.866 1.974*** 2.377*** 
 
(0.497) (0.654) (0.127) (0.140) (0.394) (0.567) (0.120) (0.132) 
Constant 14.568*** 20.985*** 13.615*** 14.893*** 19.721*** 25.174*** 14.718*** 14.662*** 
 
(1.210) (1.491) (0.688) (0.649) (1.353) (1.701) (0.483) (0.469) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 6997 6997 6997 6997 8256 8256 8256 8256 
adj. R-sq 0.369 0.394 0.807 0.696 0.397 0.387 0.805 0.669 
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Table 1.11: Sub-Sample: CF 
This table presents cash flow subsample tests of firm value with China Economic Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity using firm-year data from year 1999 to 2014. 
The dependent variable in columns is Tobin Q (market value and total market value as denominators respectively) and natural logarithm of the amount of 
market value (total market value). High CF is defined as the cash flow ratio higher than median value of all listed firms by each year. Sensitivity used as the 
coefficient estimation of the CEPU level from the monthly CAPM model. All specifications control for lagged one year firms’ characteristics, which include size, 
capex, age, total leverage and cash flow. All specifications include firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  High CF Low CF 
  (1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3)log(mv) (4)log(tmv) (5) Qmv (6) Qtmv (7)log(mv) (8)log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) -1.581** -2.073** -0.919*** -1.186*** 0.791 0.106 -0.155 -0.372 
 
(0.623) (0.853) (0.310) (0.297) (0.549) (0.697) (0.278) (0.247) 
lag(Size) -0.467*** -0.642*** 0.441*** 0.439*** -0.882*** -1.052*** 0.297*** 0.309*** 
 
(0.055) (0.066) (0.024) (0.024) (0.053) (0.066) (0.026) (0.024) 
lag(Capex) -0.011 -0.150 0.520*** 0.597*** 0.480*** 0.296 0.618*** 0.690*** 
 
(0.152) (0.214) (0.103) (0.093) (0.183) (0.217) (0.090) (0.088) 
Age 0.182 0.057 0.180** 0.056 0.321** 0.370* 0.149 0.156** 
 
(0.137) (0.158) (0.087) (0.074) (0.161) (0.190) (0.095) (0.079) 
lag(Leverage) 0.232* 0.380** -0.479*** -0.310*** -0.057 -0.022 -0.346*** -0.228*** 
 
(0.140) (0.188) (0.063) (0.057) (0.112) (0.154) (0.059) (0.049) 
Cash flow 6.283*** 10.310*** 3.916*** 4.541*** -2.691*** -3.345*** 0.999*** 1.186*** 
 
(0.563) (0.693) (0.245) (0.242) (0.394) (0.522) (0.084) (0.090) 
Constant 10.426*** 16.146*** 11.274*** 12.507*** 19.501*** 24.903*** 14.461*** 15.227*** 
 
(1.116) (1.350) (0.511) (0.505) (1.086) (1.378) (0.523) (0.493) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 7495 7495 7495 7495 7758 7758 7758 7758 
adj. R-sq 0.400 0.463 0.821 0.706 0.452 0.412 0.816 0.705 
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Table 1.12: Sub-Sample: Cross-sectional market index 
This table presents result using firm-year data from year 1998 to 2009 matched with the availability of the market index. The dependent variable is Tobin Q 
using the current market value as denominator. Sensitivity here is used as the coefficient estimation of CEPU growth ratio from the monthly CAPM model when 
using different market return measurements.  High Market index is defined as the market index higher than median value of all provinces by each year. All 
specifications control for lagged one year firms’ characteristics, which include size, capital expenditure, total leverage and the cash flow. All specifications 
include level four firm and year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
  High Market Index Low Market Index 
  (1) Qmv (2) Qtmv (3)log(mv) (4)log(tmv) (5) Qmv (6) Qtmv (7)log(mv) (8)log(tmv) 
lag(Sensitivity) 0.041 -0.906 0.013 -0.579* -1.580** -2.758** -0.929** -1.246*** 
 
(0.633) (1.075) (0.356) (0.319) (0.662) (1.134) (0.367) (0.353) 
lag(Size) -0.616*** -0.947*** 0.434*** 0.415*** -0.764*** -1.069*** 0.416*** 0.420*** 
 
(0.113) (0.163) (0.032) (0.032) (0.095) (0.122) (0.031) (0.032) 
lag(Capex) 0.189 0.135 0.522*** 0.501*** -0.013 -0.232 0.257** 0.232** 
 
(0.181) (0.311) (0.118) (0.123) (0.190) (0.286) (0.116) (0.110) 
Age 0.219 0.311 0.213* 0.181* -0.310 -0.669* -0.058 -0.199 
 
(0.187) (0.280) (0.123) (0.109) (0.271) (0.360) (0.129) (0.123) 
lag(Leverage) 0.116 -0.094 -0.420*** -0.338*** 0.430** 0.437* -0.318*** -0.259*** 
 
(0.173) (0.267) (0.071) (0.067) (0.181) (0.231) (0.069) (0.071) 
Cash flow -0.535 0.228 1.632*** 1.856*** -0.556 0.373 1.576*** 1.749*** 
 
(0.468) (0.738) (0.158) (0.156) (0.593) (0.794) (0.133) (0.137) 
Constant 14.035*** 21.423*** 11.099*** 12.096*** 17.559*** 25.798*** 12.042*** 13.156*** 
 
(2.493) (3.613) (0.713) (0.703) (2.142) (2.711) (0.649) (0.646) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 4136 4136 4136 4136 4327 4327 4327 4327 
adj. R-sq 0.462 0.434 0.793 0.710 0.477 0.450 0.817 0.736 
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Evidence from China 
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Abstract 
 
We provide micro-firm evidence how global trade promotes corporate innovation 
in China. Firms with high level of foreign export innovate more than firms relying 
on domestic sales. The difference in patents for firms with high vs. low level of 
foreign exports is significant in magnitude and increases drastically over time. 
Such difference is more pronounced in non-SOE subsample. A battery of 
endogeneity tests including RMB policy change or bilateral treaties show that 
export has a causality effect on innovations. Within industries evidence suggests 
that Chinese multinationals catch up on patents where US peers retreat. Firms 
with export enjoy technology spill-over from US innovation in low-tech industries 
but not high tech. Our research suggests that global export improves technology 
spill-over Chinese multinationals especially non-SOEs and low-tech firms. 
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2.1 Introduction 
According to the Global Agenda Forum of the World Economic Forum in 
2012, innovative emerging multinationals become an important force in the global 
markets and start to successfully compete with well-established multinationals 
from developed countries. Emerging multinationals especially Chinese firms have 
made impressive progress in innovation activities. For example, The Economist 
has series of coverage to describe
13
 how Huawei, the giant emerging telecom 
private firm in Shenzhen invests heavily in innovations, makes breakthrough 
innovations and grows to be a leader from a follower in the global market. The 
phenomenon of emerging multinationals on innovations and competitive 
advantage has fuelled wide concern among academic circles, market participants 
and policy makers. A large literature emerges to analyze the impact of emerging 
Chinese manufacturing firms on US and Europe corporations. For example, 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), Pierce and Schott (2015), Acemoglu et al. 
(2016), and Dorn et al. (2014) all study how Chinese rising manufacturing 
multinationals affect labor market in the US. Bloom et al (2016) and Autor et al 
(2016) look at the impacts of China's trade on European and US corporate 
innovation, respectively. The trade threat of Chinese emerging manufacturing 
firms may be transitory if they rely only on cheaper labor without core innovation 
edge. 
                                                             
13
The Economist has continuously covers Huawei’s growth in the global telecom market to be a leader. 
Reports can be found in the magazines on September 24th 2009, August 4th, 2012, September 20th 2014, May 
30th, 2015. 
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Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) theoretically model export and innovation and 
consider both are endogenous choices to promote growth. We follow their 
framework and try to identify a causal relationship between export and innovation 
using China as the context. China offers an ideal setting to study the effect of 
export and innovation since export has been an important impetus for promote 
economic growth. On the other hand, innovation has increasingly become a 
national strategy for Chinese government to advance industrialization and 
development. Hu, Zhang and Zhao (2017) show that China overtook U.S. in 2011 
to become the country filing the largest number of patent applications. Liu and 
Qiu (2016) find that input tariff cut because of China's WTO accession results in 
less innovation undertaken by Chinese domestic firms. Different from these 
studies, we study whether corporate export propels firms to innovate in order to 
compete globally.  
Paunov (2016) find that corruption smothers corporate patents but has no 
impacts on exporters using a global data. His finding suggests that exporters may 
behave differently from other corporations in their relationship with innovation. 
We thus take a systematic examination the causal effect of export on corporate 
innovation. Specifically, we try to answer the following questions. How does 
rising export of Chinese multinationals enhance their innovation? Are they gaining 
ground in innovations that just meet the needs of domestic consumers, or are they 
catching up with their global peers or even starting to replace them? With firm 
level data on exporting and patents, this paper provides concrete micro-evidence 
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on these questions by relating corporate global trading activities and to firm level 
innovation activities.  
Our main hypothesis is that emerging multinationals have more incentives to 
innovate and they innovate more than other firms with less participation in global 
trading. We measure Chinese emerging multinationals with the weight of foreign 
sales in total sales. Those firms with greater exposure to foreign trades and 
competition, e.g., more foreign sales will have to compete globally for market 
share. To achieve this, they need to build up competitiveness in the global scale 
and through the fundamental approach of innovations. Although there is 
consensus in the media and press that Chinese corporations start to have 
a significant presence in investing in and promoting innovation, it remains unclear 
what firms are driving innovation waves in China. Our prior is that Chinese 
corporations that are participating global trading and competition become the 
emerging force to drive the innovation waves in China. 
The second hypothesis posits that Chinese non-SOEs with active global 
export participations or trade exposures are innovation drivers. Although SOEs 
have a heavy presence in China’s economy, they are often found to be 
inefficiently managed (Megginson, Nash, Randenborgh, 1994). Many consider 
SOEs big but not strong or competitive because the government allows SOEs to 
operate in monopolistic domestic sectors or regulated industries. As the 
environment lack of fierce competition, SOEs do not have a strong incentive to 
innovate. SOEs are notorious for being afflicted with severe agency problems and 
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moral hazard problems. Executives of SOEs in general do not invest in long-term 
projects such as innovation due to unique political incentives and short career 
horizon (Cao, Leng, Julio and Zhou, 2016). SOEs often enjoy the benefits of low 
cost of capital. On the other hand, firms especially non-SOEs with great 
participation in global market need to compete in global scales. The only approach 
is to innovate to build product and market competitiveness.  
 The third hypothesis is that Chinese emerging multinationals innovate more 
in areas or industries where their US peers are retreating. Despite of a popular 
view that Chinese manufacturing firms largely carry out reverse engineering in 
high-tech sectors, Chinese firms have significantly increased corporate 
expenditures on research and development (R&D) on technological innovations. 
Chinese multinationals are not only exporting low value-added products but also 
high-technology products in IT and telecommunications sectors. We therefore 
relate patenting activities of Chinese manufacturing multinationals to their US 
peers, and empirically test whether Chinese firms are able to benefit from 
technology spillover via trading activities. Falvey, Foster, Greenaway (2004), 
Fernandes (2007), Keller (1998), Liu and Buck (2007), Lumenga-Neso, 
Olarreaga, and Schiff (2005), and Madsen (2007) all show that trades serve as an 
important channel for knowledge transmission with macro evidence. Mancusi 
(2008) proposes that knowledge spillovers depend on a country’s absorptive 
capacity of innovative performance. We further their question by providing micro 
firm evidence how exports work as a channel for knowledge transmission and the 
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effect of trade on innovation spillovers varies across firm ownership type, 
industries and exports.   
 We find that Chinese multinationals, firms with great foreign sales have 
significant more patents than other firms with low foreign sales do. Difference 
between firms with more foreign sales and no/low foreign sales is more pronounced 
in non-SOEs than in SOE subsample. The evidence suggests that Chinese 
multinationals especially non-SOEs improve their innovative performance from 
technology spillovers through channels of foreign exports. Furthermore, there is a 
significant and negative relationship between corporate patents of Chinese 
multinationals and sample average patents of their US peers at the industry level for 
high tech firms while the effect becomes positive for low-tech firms. This 
evidence suggests that Chinese multinationals are improving in innovative 
performance. There are intra-industry technology spillovers from US to China but 
only in low-tech sectors, consistent with Mancusi (2008)’s hypothesis.   
One major concern of our empirical findings is the endogeneity problem – 
reverse causality, since innovative firms may export more products and thus they 
experience more foreign sales than less innovative firms do. We address this 
concern with tests including a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach on RMB 
policy reform and instrumental variable regressions with bilateral treaties signed 
between China and foreign nations. The policy reform on RMB exchange regime 
initiated by the Chinese government in 2005
14
. The RMB policy change provides 
                                                             
14
 Chinese central government unexpectedly implemented a policy change allowing RMB to deviate from a 
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a quasi-natural experiment since it affected foreign sales greatly but not corporate 
innovation performance. The DiD tests show that foreign sales have a causal 
effect on corporate innovation. Secondly, we collect data on Chinese 
government’s bilateral investment treaties15 (BITs) signed over years and use 
them as instrumental variables for foreign exports. Signing BITs is shown to 
affect foreign sales and foreign trade exposures (Dixit, 2012). We report robust 
results that instrumented foreign sales have positive and significant effect on 
corporate patents. Lastly, we run the test with the quasi-natural experiment with 
control firms selected from the propensity score matching.
16
 The results remain 
robust. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data and 
summary statistics. Section 3 describes the main empirical results. Section 4 
represents the detailed cross-sectional tests and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2. Data, Variable Construction, and Descriptive 
Statistics 
The sample we used in the paper includes Chinese listed corporations 
during the period of 2002 to 2013. We start our sample from year 2002 since 
                                                                                                                                                                       
pegging rate to the US dollar alone to float with to a basket of currencies. As a result, RMB started to 
appreciate right after the reform starting in 2005 against major currencies especially US dollar. 
15
 Bilateral Investment Treaty is an important international legal mechanism to improve enforcement of 
contracts and property rights in order to remove impediments to foreign investment. BITs require countries to 
protect the property rights of foreign firms and allow international bodies, such as the International 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a member of the World Bank, to arbitrate any 
foreign investment disputes. 
16
 For each multinational firm, we match it with another firm having no foreign sales. The matching score 
controls for size, industry, growth potential, leverage, profitability and other firm characteristics.  
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fewer firms report their international market sales before year 2001, the time when 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). We construct our sample from 
several sources. Corporate financial data is obtained from the China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database. The foreign sales data come from 
the Wind Database (a major data vendor on listed firms in China) and is manually 
checked by segments files from CSMAR.  
We collect firm ownership data manually combined from CSMAR, 
RESSET Financial Research Database (RESSET/DB) and Wind Database, as well 
as official websites of listed companies. All the patent data is hand collected from 
the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) before year 2014, which is 
directly affiliated to China State Council and is responsible for registering 
intellectual properties including patents. For each patent, we obtain the assignee 
names from SIPO and manually match it with the name of the listed company 
both in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE).  
Considering the impact of extreme values and outliers, we winsorize all 
firm characteristics at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. We drop off listed firms under 
special treatment (ST) because they have different regulation requirement by 
CSRC (China Security Regulation Committee).
17
 We exclude firms belonging to 
financial and utility industry since they have different financial disclosure 
regulations and their liquidity positions are different from others. Similarly, we 
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ST firms are those in financial distress and under warning by the stock exchanges. 
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drop listed firms with class B shares since such shares are only eligible for foreign 
investors with a discount on A shares (Sun, Tong and Tong, 2002). The final 
sample consists of 2,251 firms and 17,710 firm-year observations with 
non-missing foreign sales and patent data, including 825 (36.65%) of these 
companies never having any foreign sales and 1,426 of these firms having record 
of foreign sales. According to ownership type, 938 (41.67%) firms are SOEs and 
the rest of the firms are non-SOEs. 
 
2.2.1. Innovation Measurement 
The voluminous literature on the economics of innovation, such as Seru 
(2012) for publicly traded firms and Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) for 
privately held firms, widely accepts patent as a primary measure of innovative 
output. The second reason for using the patent data as the innovation is the data 
availability. This patent data is available from the year 1985, long before the R&D 
expense
18
 (research expense or development expense). We use patent innovation 
data from the manually collected database, which covers all patents filed and 
granted by the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO). The database 
provides detailed information on patent assignee (owner) names, the patent 
number, application year and grant year. For specifying the year of the patent, we 
use the patent’s application year instead of grant year, following Griliches et al 
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The R&D expense is part of intangible assets before 2007. After 2007 accounting reform, it 
becomes an independent item in the balance sheet. 
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(1988). 
Comparing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
the SIPO has its own classifications on patents. According to Chinese Patent Law, 
the Chinese patents are categorized into three groups, invention patents, utility 
model patents and design patents. These three types of patents cover different 
innovation areas. Invention patents are for the new technological solutions that 
would have substantial and fundamental improvements on products or 
applications, while utility model patents are associated with improvements on 
shapes or structures of products. Design patents only focus on the innovation of 
art and design of the industrial products, including new art layout, new shape 
creation and new colour improvements.  
To better identify the different areas of innovation as well as innovation 
quality in Chinese SIPO system, we construct two innovation variables. First, 
PatentAll is the number of patent applications filed in a given year eventually 
granted. This total number of patent granted captures overall quantity of 
innovation output. However, patent counts do not distinguish ground breaking 
inventions from incremental technological discoveries. To address this, we 
construct Patent1 variable, which is the number of invention patent applications 
filed in a given year eventually granted. Invention patents are associated with high 
quality of innovation among three groups of patents in the SIPO system. Under 
the Chinese Patent Law, to successfully file the patent as invention patents (Type 1 
patent), it would take three years to review and examine in order to make sure that 
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these invention patents are making substantial and original contributions to the 
field. Since the data from SIPO is lack of the citations received to measure 
innovation quality (Hall et al., 2001; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999), we 
take the number of invention patents, which is high quality innovation, as the 
proxy of innovation quality. 
As for US market, we use patent data of all listed firms from Harvard 
University’s patent database. This database includes all patents filed and granted 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1990 to 2010. 
Similarly, we match patent assignee (owner) names, the patent number with the 
ticker names in Compustat and manually check with the errors (Griliches et al., 
1988, Cao et al., 2016). We construct industry level patent of U.S. by taking the 
average number of patents
19
 by each industry under the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) by MICS and S&P Global. GICS is a four-tiered, 
hierarchical industry classification system. It consistent of 11 sectors, 24 industry 
groups, 60 industries and 157 sub-industries (GSECTOR, GGROUP, GIND, 
GSECTOR in Compustat respectively). The detailed industry classifications are in 
Appendix B. The China Security Index Company adopted the GICS classification 
to develop a Chinese Security Industry Classification (CSIC) and made the 
industry comparable. We match the U.S. industry level patent with the 
corresponding CSIC as the proxy for the dynamic innovation environment coming 
from US industry peers.  
                                                             
19We also construct the median patent of each industry for the robustness check in unreported tables. The 
results are upon request. 
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2.2.2. Foreign Sales Measurement 
We gather information on firm’s foreign sales based on the Supplement 
Information on Sales in the annual report starting from 2002. Our main measure of 
foreign sales ratio is the proportion of a firm’s total foreign sales divided by the 
total revenue. This variable is a proxy for how much the firms rely on the foreign 
market. Firms generally provide a regional breakdown of their sales. If a firm does 
not disclose its segment sales, we code the firm’s foreign sales as zero. 
In China, the stock exchanges recommend firms to disclose their foreign 
sales starting from 2000 but, after 2007, require all listed firms to disclose if the 
foreign sales ratio is more than 10%. Thus, we also define a dummy variable, 
MNC10, for Chinese multinational corporations, which is one if the foreign sales 
ratio is greater than 10% and zero if the company does not have any foreign 
sales.
20
We use 10 percent cutoff for potential censored issue as described. Besides, 
this threshold is widely used in past literature (eg. Jorion, 1990; He & Ng, 1998; 
Pinkwitz, Stulz, Williamson, 2012). However, there are other researches using 
different thresholds of foreign sales ratio to differ the firms. Shaked (1986) and 
Tallman & Li (1996) define MNCs as ones when firms having 20 percent of sales 
abroad. Fernandes & Gonenc (2016) use 25 percent above as the standard. 
Following both strands of literature, we employ two different thresholds in paper: 
MNC10 (if more than 10%) and MNC25 (if more than 25%) and use them 
                                                             
20We treat firms with foreign sales between zero to ten percent as missing. 
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alternatively.  
 
2.2.3. Construct control variables 
We use a number of controls suggested by previous literature (e.g., Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001; Aghion, et al. 2005; Aghion, Reenen and Zingales, 2013). The 
main control variable is Tobin’s Q, defined as the book value of total assets minus 
book value of equity plus market value of equity scaled by book value of total 
assets. We also use two measurements of Q since the non-tradable share is an 
important issue in China.
21
 Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. Return on Asset (ROA) is defined as operating income before depreciation 
divided by total assets. Age is also the natural logarithm of the fiscal year minus 
the time when firm go public. Cash flow is measured as EBIT plus depreciation 
and amortization minus interest expense and taxes scaled by lagged total assets. 
Leverage here is the sum of the short-term borrowings plus the long-term debts 
and divided by the lagged total assets. Firm-level investment is the capital 
expenditures which includes the net cash payments from the acquisition of fixed 
assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement 
divided by the lagged book value of total assets. Due to the limitation of R&D 
Expense, we use tangibility instead.
22
Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets 
                                                             
21
 Chen and Xiong (2002), Bai et al.(2004) discussed the issue of non-tradable shares in China 
maybe an important issue. We obtain other measurement of Tobin’s Q as well and find a similar 
result. 
22
New Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.6 Segment- Intangible Assets require firms to identify, 
quantify and disclose the R&D expense. The R&D expense is disclosed as independent item afterwards. 
These standards are effective on Jan 1st 2008. Before 2008, the R&D expense was reported in the tangible 
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divided by total assets. 
 
2.2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the firm-years observations 
with non-missing data on foreign sales and patent information. There are 17,710 
firm-year observations within the period from 2002 to 2013. We winsorize all 
variables at 1% and 99% level. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Panel A of Table 1 describes summary statistics for the main dataset of the 
empirical analysis. We start by listing the innovation variables: ln(1+Patent1) and 
ln(1+Patent All). Each year, the average number of invention patents and total 
patents for each firm are 8.19 and 17.81, respectively. For the key independent 
variables, we use the foreign sales ratio and two foreign sales dummy variables. 
The average foreign sales ratio for each firm each year is more than 10% in 
despite of the median foreign sales ratio is still zero. Then, our firm level controls 
include total assets, firm age, a measure of firm profitability (ROA), a measure of 
growth opportunity (Tobin’s Q), a measure of investment(CAPEX), tangibility, 
leverage and cash flow.; After excluding observations with missing financial 
information, our final sample consists of only 14,608 firm-year observations. 
Panel B of Table 1 describes the innovation variables and firm 
characteristics for firms with foreign sales and purely domestic firms. 53.65% of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
assets item. 
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our firm-year observations are domestic firms. For these companies, they have 
fewer patent numbers, smaller size and lower ROA. However, the univariate tests 
indicate that firms without foreign sales are more mature, have higher Tobin’s Q 
and more tangible assets. The univariate tests show that the firms with foreign 
sales and domestic firms have little difference in terms of leverage and cash flow. 
In order to show that our sample is not unbalanced in terms of different industries, 
Panel C of Table 1 combined CSIC with GICS into the ten industry sectors and 
reports the industry distribution of the number of firms with foreign sales and 
domestic firms. While all industries have firms with foreign sales, the industries in 
which more firms do so, according to the percentage, are Industrials, Materials 
and Consumer Discretionary. Not surprisingly, these are industries in which the 
global competition and scientific knowledge may play important roles. 
 
2.3. Empirical Results 
The objective of our study is to compare the innovation output of 
multinationals and pure domestic firms. In the baseline analysis, we examine the 
innovation output of multinationals and domestic firms and report the results in 
Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, to further show the causal effect of foreign sales we 
perform a quasi-natural experiment using the exchange rate reform as the 
exogenous shock to corporate foreign sales but not to firm patents directly.  We 
use different-in-difference approach to draw the causality relationship between 
foreign sales and corporate innovations. 
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2.3.1. Baseline Regression Result 
We start by examining the innovation output of firms with foreign sales 
and firms without foreign sales. The model we used is as following, 
, 1 0 1 , , ( ),'i t i t i t t i j i j tLnPatent Fsales X              (1) 
Where i, j, and t refer to firm i, industry j, year t, respectively. The dependent 
variables in Equation (1) captures firm innovation outcomes: Ln(1+Patent1) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of invention patents granted by the 
company in year t+1 to capture innovation quality while Ln(1+Patent_all) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the total number of patents granted by the company 
in year t+1 to capture innovation quantity. We measure the foreign sales (FSales) 
in year t by using both continuous and discrete variables: foreign sales ratio, 
dummy of 10% cut-off (MNC10) and dummy of 25% cut-off (MNC25). X is a 
vector of controls that includes firm-level total assets, firm age, ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
leverage, investment and tangibility; all are measured in year t, except for firm age 
(t+1). Various specifications include year fixed effects (φ) firm fixed effects (α) or 
industry fixed effects (ω).In all regressions, robust standard errors adjusted for 
firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses.  
There are two econometric techniques commonly used to ruled out 
potentially unobserved individual effect and variable yearly economic cycles: the 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression controlling for industry and year 
fixed effects, and the panel regression controlling for firm and year fixed effects. 
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Notwithstanding firm effects play more accurate firm level individual effect; it 
does have some shortcoming. As shown in the table 1, more than half of firms are 
without foreign sales so it is difficult to distinguish the invariant firm effect from 
the foreign sales dummies. Thus, we also choose pooled OLS regression fixed by 
industry to avoid potential multicollinearity problem existing between the MNC 
dummies and the firm identity. In Table 2, for column 2, 3, 5 and 6, when 
involving MNC dummies, industry fixed effect rather than firm fixed effect are 
used for better explaining the coefficient of the MNC dummies. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the result from pooled OLS regression between 
the number of invention patents and foreign sales. The coefficient estimates of 
foreign sales ratio, MNC10, MNC25 are all positive and significant at the 5% 
level across all specifications, suggesting multinational firms innovate more than 
those domestic firms. The economic effect is sizable. The coefficient estimate in 
column1, for example, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in foreign 
sales promotes a 33.6%
23
 increase in the number of invention patents in the 
following year. In column 4, a coefficient estimate of 0.264 suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in foreign sales is associated with a 30.2% increase in 
the total number of patents in the following year. As for the case of MNC 
dummies, their magnitude is much larger. Those multinational firms (with 10% or 
more foreign sales) produce 38.3% more invention patents, 50.7% more total 
                                                             
23
Exp(0.290)-1=33.6% 
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patents than firms without foreign sales, and the multinational firms (with 25% 
more foreign sales) generally have 33.8% and 41.2% more invention patents and 
total patents, respectively than those without foreign sales. 
Regarding control variables, we find that their coefficient estimates are 
consistent with findings in earlier work. Larger firms and firms with higher capital 
expenditures are associated with more patents. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities are more innovative. Further, the debt ratio or leverage is negatively 
associated with patents. Financial constraints are also negatively related to patent 
counts. Firm age matters; young firms have more patents.  
Overall, our baseline regression results suggest a positive association 
between foreign sales and firm innovation, consistent with our first hypothesis that 
the foreign sales enhance firm innovation. We also want to study whether the 
ownership of the companies would influence the association between foreign sales 
and firm innovation. As we suggest, the companies with more foreign sales need 
to compete in global market and have more competition pressures; this 
competition pressure forces the firm to output more innovations. However, the 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) face less competitive pressure, so foreign sales or 
global market does not affect their patents or innovations. Table 3 helps us to 
explain the results.  
In Table 3, we perform a regression analysis where we augment our 
baseline specification above by including the SOE interaction term. The model we 
use is as following: 
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, 1 0 1 , 2 ,
3 , , ( ),'
i t i t i t
i t i t t i j i j t
LnPatent SOE Fsales NonSOE Fsales
SOE X
  
     
     
     
(2) 
We report the results in the columns (1) to (6) of Table 3. We include the 
same control variables as in regression specification of Equation (1), but we add 
the interaction term of SOE indicator and non-SOE indicator with foreign sales to 
identify the influence related to ownership type. We also control for the level of 
ownership may influence the innovation output as Tan et al. (2015) argued. To 
demonstrate the time invariant result, we still control for aggregate trends by 
including year fixed effects. Additionally, since our main variable of interest is the 
interaction term of SOE indicator and foreign sales, we include firm level SOE 
indicators to control the level of ownership’s effect suggest by Tan et al. (2015).  
[Insert Table 3] 
We find that foreign sales’ effect on corporate patents is majorly coming 
from private firms (non-SOE). In terms of economic magnitude, one standard 
deviation increase in the foreign sales for non-SOEs increase the number of 
invention patents and the number of total patents by 49.0% and 64.0%, 
respectively. In the contrast, for SOEs it only results in an increase by 30.7% and 
6.3%, respectively. Meanwhile, the significance also drops for the interaction of 
SOEs with foreign sales, suggesting foreign sales or global market competition 
may not affect SOEs regarding their innovative activity. When MNC25 dummy 
variables are employed alternatively, the interaction term between foreign sales 
dummy and non-SOE remain positive and significant while interaction terms 
between foreign sales dummy and SOE have less significance. This suggests that 
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foreign sales only affect non-SOEs’ innovation activities. 
After checking the ownership structure, to examine the competitive theory, 
we compare the innovation outputs of Chinese companies with their 
corresponding industries company in the U.S. First, we add the average number of 
patents in each industry in the US to check the relationship of US innovation and 
Chinese innovation. The model we use is as following:  
, 1 0 1 , , 2 ,
3 , , ( ),
_ _
'
i t j t i t j t
i t i t t i j i j t
LnPatent US Patent Fsales US Patent
Fsales X
  
     
    
     
(3) 
We form an interaction term by using the foreign sales times the US patent. 
We want to know that, within one specific industry, when the innovation output in 
the US is dropping, how the innovation of Chinese companies’ response and also 
how the foreign sales help the innovation. For the US patent information, we use 
patent innovation data on publicly listed US corporations from Harvard 
University’s patent database. This database includes all patents filed and granted 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1990 to 2010. 
The database provides detailed information on patent assignee (owner) names and 
the patent number. We combine the patent database with COMPUSTAT to get the 
companies’ innovation output data; then we aggregate the firm level data to 
industry level by using the GICS, 24 groups classification. We manually match the 
Chinese Security Industry Classification with the GICS 10 sectors and 24 groups. 
(The matching details are in Appendix B). Thus, the variable, USPatent, is 
calculated by average the number of patents in the corresponding industry. Due to 
the limitation of U.S. patent database, the period of matched sample is dropped to 
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the year before 2009 and the number of observation decreases to 9143. 
[Insert Table 4] 
We report the results estimating equation (3) in Table 4. In the regression, 
the signs of the interaction term and the US patent variables are negative. This 
negative association means in the industry where US innovation is decreasing, the 
increase of foreign sales in Chinese firms would help to increase the firms’ 
innovations. For example, in column (1), one standard deviation decreases of 
average number of patents among US corresponding industry with one standard 
deviation increase in Chinese firm’s foreign sales would leads to 0.113 patents for 
each company. This negative relationship also implies that when the US 
companies are retreating in an industry and the US companies decrease the 
innovation output in industry level, Chinese firm’s innovation can increase more 
by increasing their foreign sales. When the US companies are not actively 
competing in an industry, the Chinese firms have more incentive to capture the 
market. The result is also consistent with competing theory. For multinationals 
with high foreign sales ratio, they are more relying on the global market. When 
they find the US is decreasing the innovation output in the industry, they have 
more incentives to step into the industry. So, they increase their innovations to win 
the competitiveness.   
To further examine our hypothesis, we consider the sub-sample regression 
analysis between different industries. According to our theory, the pressure of 
competition is much severer in the industries that US companies are also devoting 
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to innovate, for example, high tech industries. So, the competition phenomenon is 
more obvious among these industries. Similarly, for the traditional industries, US 
companies are outsourcing the operations so that the Chinese multinationals face 
less competition. Low competitions generate the complementary effect. Being the 
follower, the Chinese multinationals are mimicking the innovation of US 
companies through the foreign sales. In Table 5, we present the results for 
different industries.  
[Insert Table 5] 
In Table 5, we find the consistent result of the significant effect for 
different industries. We define the company as high-tech companies through the 
definition of tax deduction policy from the Chinese government. We group the 
companies having high-tech tax deduction into the high-tech category and the rest 
companies as the low-tech category. The results show that with high tech group, 
the coefficient of interaction terms of US patent and foreign sales are negative, 
meaning the competition relationship between the US companies and Chinese 
multinationals. However, for the low-tech group, all the coefficients are positive, 
which demonstrate the complementary relationship between the US companies 
and Chinese multinationals. 
 In this section, the results of our baseline regression analysis are consistent 
with our initial hypothesis. Assumed by the competition theory, non-SOE 
multinationals in high tech industry have more innovation outputs since they face 
high competition pressure both domestically and internationally. 
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2.3.2. The Difference-in-difference Approach 
Our baseline analysis utilizes the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. However, there is a plausible concern that these regression results 
may suffer from endogenous problems, that is, firms with better growth prospects 
or with anticipation in innovation may be more attractive in global market and 
have more foreign sales. This could also explain the positive association between 
foreign sales and innovation output, leading to concerns on reverse causality. 
To test a causal effect of foreign sales and innovation and rule out the 
possibility of reverse causality, we perform a quasi-natural experiment using the 
Exchange Rate Reform in China as the exogenous shock to corporate foreign sales. 
This Exchange Rate Reform in 2005 was an unexpected event to corporations and 
the market. Since 1997, People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Chinese central bank, 
had effectively pegged the CNY to the USD at rate of 8.28 yuan/dollar. However, 
on July 21, 2005, PBOC announced that CNY would be managed to float with 
reference to a basket of currencies. On August 9, 2005, the Governor of PBOC 
disclosed a list of 11 reference currencies, which made the CNY appreciated for 2% 
suddenly. The sudden shock for the currency due to this unexpected exchange 
policy reform provides a quasi-natural experiment that generates plausibly 
exogenous variation in corporate foreign sales for exporting firms in our sample. 
To control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and remove potential bias due to 
time-invariant firm-level omitted variables, we run regressions with firm fixed 
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effects and industry fixed effects. This allows our analysis to be free from 
unobserved firm individual effects that may explain their patents.  
We employ a difference-in-difference (DiD) regression to compare the 
innovation output of the treatment firms and control firms three years before 
(2003-2005) and three years after (2006-2008) the announcement of the Exchange 
Rate Reform. Treatment group includes the firms with foreign sales and 
influenced by the exchange rate reform in 2005. Control group is the firms 
without foreign sales and not influenced by the exchange rate reform. The number 
of observations in treatment group is 3,781 while the number of observations in 
control group is 3,162. We perform the DiD tests in a multivariate regression 
framework by estimating the following regression model: 
, 1 0 1 , , 2 ,
3 , , ( ),'
i t i t i t i t
i t i t t i j i j t
LnPatent ExPolicy Fsales ExPolicy
Fsales X
  
     
    
     
(4) 
Where the dependent variable captures firm innovation outcomes. 
ExPolicy is a dummy variable that equals one for period after 2005 (2006-2008) 
and zero for period (2002-2005). X consists of a vector of control variables used 
in Equation (4); , ,t i j   capture year fixed effects, firm fixed effect and industry 
fixed effect. The coefficient estimate of ExPolicy Fsales  is the DiD estimator 
that captures the causal effect of firm with foreign sales and influenced by the 
Exchange Rate Reform on firm innovation.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 reports the regression results estimating Equation (3) with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. In column 1 to column 3, the dependent variable 
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is Ln (1+Patent1), the number of invention patents; for column 4 to column 6, the 
dependent variable is Ln (1+Patent All), the total number of patents. The 
interactions of ExPolicy with foreign sales are significant and positive at 1% level. 
The innovation driven is mainly caused by the multinational firms after the 
passage of Exchange Rate Reform. Our identification tests based on the DiD 
approach suggest that there appears to be a positive, causal effect of foreign sales 
on firm innovation. The evidence is consistent with our first hypothesis that 
foreign sales enhance firm innovation. 
To exclude the selection bias problem, we approach on propensity score 
matching (PSM) method to control for any potential bias. For each year we match 
multinational firms with firms without foreign sales but having similar firm 
characteristics on the right sides such as size, growth opportunity, leverage and 
profitability. The distance (caliber distance) of matching we used is 0.05 by each 
year and the treatment groups are those multinational firms we defined as MNC10 
and MNC25. In Figure 1, we present the level of innovation output (Patent 1 as 
well as Patent All) of two types of firms after PSM. The left panel shows the 
number of invention patents while the right panel of figures are using the total 
number of patents. In this univariate analysis, we show that difference between 
multinationals and domestics is larger after the passage of exchange policy 
reform. 
We then approach the DiD multivariate analysis after the PSM procedure 
and present the results in Table 6. The number of observation drops since we only 
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keep data within distance of treatment groups with control groups. TMNC10 and 
TMNC25 measure the foreign sales in the treatment groups after matching the 
sample with PSM, changing the cut-off ratio from 10% to 25%.  
[Insert Table 7] 
As shown in Table 7, the regressions estimated coefficients of the 
interaction term between foreign sales dummy and policy dummy are still positive, 
with slightly drop of significance. We also show that after 2005, the influence 
from foreign sales on innovations becomes much stronger, which is consistent 
with the univariate tests in Figure 1. The greater coefficients on TMNC10 and 
TMNC25 after the exchange reform suggest that the increase in innovation output 
is larger for the treatment groups than for the control groups after the exchange 
reform. 
The evidence from the DiD tests suggests that multinationals experience a 
larger increase in their innovation output compared to the pure domestic 
companies after the exchange reform. The reform can be used as a shock since it 
is only influences the foreign sales and relatively unrelated with the innovation 
output. This quasi natural experiment confirms that the change of foreign sales 
proportion can have a positive effect on the output of innovation in Chinese firms. 
 
2.3.3. Robust Test on Endogeneity Problem with Bilateral Treaties 
We further address the endogeneity concern by using the Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BIT) signed between China and another country as an 
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instrument for foreign sales, since signing more BITs encourages more exports.  
Bilateral Investment Treaty is an important international legal mechanism 
to improve enforcement of contracts and property rights to remove impediments 
to foreign investment. BITs require countries to protect the property rights of 
foreign firms and allow international bodies, such as the International 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a member of the 
World Bank, to arbitrate any foreign investment disputes. While BITs were 
designed to encourage the capital flows to foreign countries, signing BITs affects 
the foreign sales and the foreign exposures (Dixit, 2012), as two signed nations 
often have favored treatment on sales of products (Dolzer and Stevens, 1995). 
Thus, using the BITs as the instrument variable helps to measure the 
influence of foreign sales on innovation not due to firm’s innovations. We show 
that the exogenous increase in foreign sales due to new BITs has a positive effect 
on innovation, suggesting that the correlation between foreign sales and 
innovation is not primarily due to self-selection. We consider the inclusion of 
number of signed BITs as an instrumental variable for foreign sales. BIT would 
encourage export for several reasons. Prior literatures have demonstrated the 
close relationship between the foreign exposures and signature of new BITs 
(Dunning, 1998; Busse, Königer and Nunnenkamp, 2010; Berger, Busse, 
Nunnenkamp and Roy, 2011). Furthermore, BIT provides protection of foreign 
operations which often results in sharp increase of foreign sales. We thus first 
show that the number of the BITs and the weighted export by the number of 
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BITs are significant positively correlated with companies’ foreign sales, which is 
one of the requirements for number of BITs to be a valid instrument. BIT is 
between two nations which does not influence any company’s R&D or 
innovation. It allows us to take out any firm specific factors related to innovation 
and identify the causal effect of foreign sales.  
We collect the BITs data from the ICSID website. This data contains the 
signatory States, the particular treaty and year of signature. We only look at the 
data that one signatory nation is China. The data on BIT covers from 2001 to 
2012. After merged with our innovation and financials database, there will be 
13,257 year-firm observations remaining. We use the cumulative number of BITs 
that China signed with other countries as the instrumental variable in the first 
stage (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Alternative instrumental variable is the 
increase in number of BITs, weighted by the share of changing export to the 
region signed BIT with China accounts for relative to the total changing export 
of China (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). The weighting is to account for 
differences in the size of exporting a country makes for via signing a BIT. Figure 
2 shows the cumulative number of BITs signed by China per year and the 
increase number of BITs weighted by changing export. When we measure the 
time of signed BITs, since we need to compare the influence of BITs to the 
company’s foreign sales, we consider the BITs signed before June having the 
influence on the same year but the BITs signed after June having the effect on 
the next following year.  
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[Insert Figure 2] 
We report the IV regressions in Table 8. We present the weak instrument 
variable test and Hausman based test to examine the validity of the BITs as 
instrumental variables, and report two-stage least squares (2SLS) results in the 
following section. The first column reproduces the baseline regression; columns 
2 and 4 present the first stage where we regress the foreign sales on the 
cumulative number of BITs and the exporting weighted number of BITs and all 
other controls. As expected, the instrument is positive and highly significant. It is 
clear that signing new BITs lead to increase the foreign sales. In the column 3 
and column 5, we present the results of using the forecasted foreign sales as the 
explanatory variable and remain the same control variable. Interestingly, the 
foreign sales variable remains highly significant with a coefficient that is much 
larger than column 1. The BITs instrument shows that instrumented foreign sales 
increase patent counts. The one standard deviation increase in the foreign sales, 
which is caused by the increase of the cumulative signed BITs, would, on 
average, increase the number of type 1 patent and the number of all patent by 
140 and 321, respectively.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Thus, by using the increase of BITs as the instrumental variable, we show 
that the influence of foreign sales on the innovation becomes much stronger. 
Adding the BITs into the regression helps us to identify the increase of foreign 
sales irrelevant to the firm performance and other factors that would also 
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influence the innovation. These isolated increases of foreign sales give a sharp 
surge on innovation. Because of the sharp rise in the magnitude and the 
significance for the coefficients, we are confident about the causality between 
the foreign sales and innovation. As shown in Table 8, after excluding other 
factors’ influence on sales, the significant and positive effect of foreign sales on 
innovation becomes very robust.   
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 This paper studies how Chinese multinationals are emerging to innovate 
more and become competitive globally. We show that Chinese firms with greater 
foreign sales exhibit more patents than other firms with no or less foreign sales. 
Cross sectional tests show that the difference in patents is more pronounced in firms 
with greater incentives to innovate, e.g., firms with low degree of agency problem, 
firms operating in competitive product market, and firms of high-tech sectors. 
Further, the effect of difference in patents only exists in non-SOE firms, suggesting 
that non-SOE firms with more foreign sales are the driving force for the increase in 
corporate innovations. Chinese emerging multinational corporations innovate more 
when their US industry peers are retreating in patents. This evidence suggests that 
the participation in the foreign market is positively associated with more innovation 
activities. 
 We utilize several tests to show our results are not caused by the 
endogeneity problem which states that innovative firms are more competitive and 
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export more goods, resulting in higher foreign sales. We first use propensity score 
matching method to compare the difference in patents between firms with greater 
foreign sales and those with no/less foreign sales. Second, we utilize a quasi-natural 
experiment when Chinese government reformed its RMB regime from fixed rate to 
floating rate which causes an exogenous shock to corporate foreign sales. The 
difference-in-difference approach yields consistent and robust results. Corporate 
foreign sales have a casual effect on corporate patents. The combined evidence 
suggests that non-SOE firms with great participation in global trading activities 
drive corporate innovations.  
Our research has the important and general implication for policy makers, 
market participants and academic circles. It highlights the importance of the 
success of Chinese trading activities in global scales that has greatly fuelled 
corporate innovation activities. Chinese emerging multinationals are becoming 
more innovative and they starting to catch up or even replace some of innovation 
activities dominated by their US peer firms. Participation in global trading 
activities serves an important drive for innovations that are pivotal for economic 
growth.  
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Appendix 2.A: Variable Definition and Construction 
 
Variables Definitions Source 
Innovation 
  
Patent 1 
The total number of invention patent applications filed (and eventually 
granted) by a firm in a given year. All missing variables are replaced by 
zero. 
Hand Collected  
Patent All 
The total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) by a firm in a 
given year. All missing variables are replaced by zero. 
Hand Collected  
Foreign Sales   
Fsales 
The ratio of foreign sales to the total sales and missing foreign sales are 
checked with the annual reports and equals to zero if a firm do not export. 
Wind 
MNC10 
Dummy variable set equal to one if foreign sales is more than 10% of total 
sales and equal to zero if foreign sales is zero. 
Wind 
MNC25 
Dummy variable set equal to one if foreign sales is more than 25% of total 
sales and equal to zero if foreign sales is zero. 
Wind 
Key Variables 
  
Ln(Total Assets) 
The logarithm of the book value of total assets measured at the end of fiscal 
year t. 
CSMAR 
Ln(Age) 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years since the firm has its 
listed price. 
CSMAR 
ROA 
Return on assets, defined as operating income before depreciation divided 
by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
CSMAR 
Tobin's Q 
Book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity scaled by book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
CSMAR 
CAPEX 
Capital expenditure divided by book value of total assets   measured at the 
end of the fiscal year t-1. 
CSMAR 
Tangibility 
Book value of tangible assets scaled by book value of total assets, measured 
at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
CSMAR 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. CSMAR 
Cash Flow  
EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus interest expense and taxes 
divided by book value of assets, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
CSMAR 
SOE Dummy 
Indicator whether the largest shareholder or the ultimate owner of the listed 
firms is state-owned at the end of year t. 
CSMAR, 
Wind, Hand 
Collected 
HHI 
Herfindahl index of GICS industries classifications to which the firm 
belongs, measured at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
CSMAR 
KZ 
The KZ index measured at the end of fiscal year, calculated as -1.002 × Cash 
flow [(Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and 
Amortization)/Lagged net property, plant and equipment] + 0.283 × Q 
[Market value of equity + book value of total assets-book value of 
equity-balance sheet deferred tax] + 3.139×Leverage[Total debt/Total 
assets] - 39.368 × Dividends [(Dividends)/Lagged net property, plant and 
CSMAR 
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equipment] - 3.315 × Cash holdings [(Cash and short-term 
investment)/(Lagged net property, plant and equipment)]. 
High Tech 
Dummy 
Indicator equals to one when firms are qualified as the high-tech 
requirement made by government and thus received benefits like tax 
deduction at the end of year t. 
CSMAR 
US Patent 
The industry-level average number of patents in the U.S. market; this 
number was matched through corresponding industry (GICS four levels) to 
Chinese firms. 
Harvard US 
Patent 
Database 
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Appendix 2.B: Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS): China vs. 
U.S.
24
 
The Chinese Securities Industry Classification (CSIC) provided by China Security Index Co. Ltd 
(CSI) is widely used in China. It follows similar classification rules according to the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) by MICS and S&P Global. 
 
Industry Name CSIC GICS 
Level 1 CSIClv1 Gsector 
Energy 00 10 
Materials  01 15 
Industrials  02 20 
Consumer Discretionary 03 25 
Consumer Staples 04 30 
Health Care  05 35 
Financials 06 40 
Information Technology 07 45 
Telecommunication Services 08 50 
Utilities 09 55 
Real Estate  60 
Level 2 CSIClv2 Ggroup 
Energy 0001 1010 
Materials 0101 1510 
Capital Goods 0201 2010 
Commercial Services & Supplies 0202 2020 
Transportation 0203 2030 
Automobiles & Components 0301 2510 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 0302 2520 
Consumer Services 0303 2530 
Media 0304 2540 
Retailing 0305 2550 
Food & Staples Retailing 0401 3010 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0402 3020 
Household & Personal Products 0403 3030 
Health Care Equipment & Services 0501 3510 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 0502 3520 
Banks 0601 4010 
Diversified Financials 0602 4020 
Insurance 0603 4030 
Real Estate 0604 4040 
Software & Services 0701 4510 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 0702 4520 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 0703 4530 
                                                             
24
Detailed information can be found here: https://www.msci.com/gics. 
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Telecommunication Services 0801 
5010 
Communications Equipment 0802 
Utilities 0901 5510 
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Figure 2.1: Propensity Score Matching for DiD Test 
The figure below plots the change in the number of patents that a firm file measured in the log 
scale, following the exchange reform policy in 2005.Foreign sales data is only available from year 
2002, year after China joined the WTO. The top panel of the figure presents relationship between 
the control group and treatment group of MNC10 while the bottom panel of the figure presents 
relationship between the control group and treatment group of MNC25. The left panel of figures 
are using the number of invention patents while the right panel of figures are using the total 
number of patents. To exclude potential selection bias issue, treatment groups are using propensity 
score matching (PSM). For each year, we select multinational firms with domestic firms by 
choosing similar characteristics, such as size, growth opportunity, leverage and profitability, as 
control variables in the multivariate analysis. We use caliper matching procedure that each firm 
have a matching distance with a 0.05 using psmatch2 in Stata. The results are robust whatever 
caliper parameters are chosen. 
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Figure 2.2: Time Trend for Treaty 
This figure shows the time trend of the cumulative number of Treaties which is signed by China in 
each year and the weighted change of export from 2001 to 2011. The weighted change of export is 
the calculated by using the number of treaties signed between specific country and China 
multiplied by the percentage of the change of export from China to this country proportional to the 
total changed of Chinese export.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample firms during the period 2002-2013. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. We start with the patent data and control variables. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics for firms' innovation output and other control variables. Panel B 
presents the comparisons between the firms without foreign sales and firms with foreign sales. The 
last column reports the difference in mean between the two types of firms. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively using robust standard errors for two-tailed 
tests. Panel C reports the industry distribution of the number of firms with foreign sales and 
domestic firms. The industry classifications are using the China Securities Industry Classification 
(CSIC) consistent with Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
      
Variables N Mean 
 
S.D. Min. 
 
Median Max. 
ln(1+Patent1) 17,710 0.7646 
 
1.1453 0.0000 
 
0.0000 8.6618 
ln(1+Patent All) 17,710 1.2252 
 
1.4956 0.0000 
 
0.6931 8.7513 
Fsales 17,710 0.1048 
 
0.1974 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.9927 
MNC10 14,313 0.3361 
 
0.4724 0.0000 
 
0.0000 1.0000 
MNC25 12,147 0.2177 
 
0.4127 0.0000 
 
0.0000 1.0000 
Ln(Total Assets) 16,328 21.3892 
 
1.1678 17.8078 
 
21.2391 26.1661 
Ln(Age) 17,696 2.3123 
 
0.5324 0.0000 
 
2.3979 3.3322 
ROA 16,328 0.0460 
 
0.1023 -0.5795 
 
0.0376 1.2596 
Tobin's Q 17,161 2.1322 
 
1.6042 0.6692 
 
1.6573 24.2719 
CAPEX 16,328 0.0740 
 
0.0884 -0.2640 
 
0.0486 0.7397 
Tangilibity 16,328 0.3144 
 
0.2148 0.0000 
 
0.2728 2.2896 
Leverage 16,263 0.2287 
 
0.2154 0.0000 
 
0.1993 2.2463 
Cash Flow 15,951 0.0810 
 
0.1142 -0.5159 
 
0.0686 1.8419 
SOE Dummy 17,661 0.4733 
 
0.4993 0.0000 
 
0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B: Mean Comparison       
Variables 
Without 
FSales(0)  
With FSales(1) 
 
(0)-(1) 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Mean 
Diff  
ln(1+Patent1) 9,502 0.4918 
 
8,208 1.0804 
 
-0.5886*** 
ln(1+Patent All) 9,502 0.8160 
 
8,208 1.6989 
 
-0.8829*** 
Ln(Total Assets) 8,859 21.2712 
 
7,469 21.5293 
 
-0.2581*** 
Ln(Age) 9,492 2.3244 
 
8,204 2.2982 
 
0.0262*** 
ROA 8,859 0.0439 
 
7,469 0.0484 
 
-0.0045*** 
Tobin's Q 9,191 2.2244 
 
7,970 2.0259 
 
0.1985*** 
CAPEX 8,859 0.0684 
 
7,469 0.0807 
 
-0.0123*** 
Tangilibity 8,859 0.3188 
 
7,469 0.3092 
 
0.0097*** 
Leverage 8,816 0.2296 
 
7,447 0.2276 
 
0.002 
Cash Flow 8,562 0.0808 
 
7,389 0.0811 
 
-0.0003 
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SOE Dummy 9,471 0.5177 
 
8,190 0.4220 
 
0.0957*** 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution       
Industry Names 
Without FSales 
 
With FSales 
 
Total 
Obs Percent 
 
Obs Percent 
 
Obs Percent 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
2,000 21.05 
 
1,479 18.02 
 
3,479 19.64 
Consumer Staples 1,007 10.6 
 
503 6.13 
 
1510 8.53 
Energy 416 4.38 
 
216 2.63 
 
632 3.57 
Health Care 782 8.23 
 
533 6.49 
 
1315 7.43 
Industrials 2,480 26.1 
 
2,193 26.72 
 
4,673 26.39 
Information 
Technology 
779 8.2 
 
982 11.96 
 
1761 9.94 
Materials 1,805 19 
 
2,070 25.22 
 
3,875 21.88 
Telecommunication 
Services 
233 2.45 
 
232 2.83 
 
465 2.63 
Total 9,502 100 
 
8,208 100 
 
17,710 100 
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Table 2.2: Baseline Regression 
This table reports the regressions of firm innovation on firm foreign sales. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of invention patents filed (and eventually granted) 
by a firm in a given year in panel A. In panel B, the dependent variable is natural logarithm of one 
plus total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) by a firm in a given year. The main 
variables of interest are foreign sales ratios, 10% cut-off foreign sales ratio dummy and 25% 
cut-off foreign sales ratio dummy. The foreign sales ratio is calculated as the percentage of revenue 
from foreign countries on the total revenue. The 10% cut foreign sales ratio dummy equals to one 
if the foreign sales ratio is greater than 10% and equals to zero if the firm doesn’t have foreign 
sales. The 25% cut foreign sales ratio dummy equals to one if the foreign sales ratio is greater than 
25% and equals to zero if the firm doesn’t have foreign sales. The set of control variables includes 
the natural logarithm of firm assets, the natural logarithm of one plus firm age at the IPO year, 
return on assets, Tobin’s Q, firm leverage, firm investment measured by capital expenditure scaled 
by firm assets, tangibility measured by PPE scaled by firm assets. All regressions include firm 
(industry), year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) Panel B: Ln(1+Patent All) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lag(Fsales) 0.290** 
 
  0.264** 
  
 
(0.113) 
 
  (0.124) 
  
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.324***   
 
0.410*** 
 
 
 
(0.047)   
 
(0.061) 
 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.291*** 
  
0.345*** 
 
  
(0.062) 
  
(0.076) 
lag(Ln(Total Assets) 0.239*** 0.342*** 0.306*** 0.258*** 0.421*** 0.387*** 
 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044) 
Ln(Age) 0.462*** -0.228*** -0.231*** 0.649*** -0.377*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.114) (0.048) (0.047) (0.130) (0.064) (0.063) 
lag(ROA) -0.136* 0.278** 0.238* -0.092 0.491*** 0.464*** 
 
(0.076) (0.135) (0.139) (0.096) (0.172) (0.175) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.016** 0.065*** 0.057*** 0.015* 0.071*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) 
lag(Leverage) -0.109** -0.452*** -0.399*** -0.131* -0.773*** -0.711*** 
 
(0.055) (0.082) (0.081) (0.071) (0.117) (0.116) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.022 0.597*** 0.611*** 0.073 0.802*** 0.851*** 
 
(0.092) (0.148) (0.151) (0.114) (0.194) (0.197) 
lag(Tangibility) 0.077 -0.060 -0.045 0.079 0.002 0.008 
 
(0.061) (0.095) (0.096) (0.077) (0.127) (0.130) 
Constant -5.498*** -6.627*** -5.873*** -5.850*** -7.665*** -6.966*** 
 
(0.748) (0.801) (0.865) (0.835) (0.898) (0.938) 
Firm FE Y N N Y N N 
Industry Lv2 FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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N 14608 12078 10420 14608 12078 10420 
adj. R-sq 0.158 0.285 0.265 0.147 0.311 0.291 
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Table 2.3: Baseline Regression of SOE Ownership  
This table reports the regressions of firm innovation on firm foreign sales and adds the SOEs 
interaction term. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
invention patents filed (and eventually granted) by a firm in a given year in panel A. In panel B, 
the dependent variable is natural logarithm of one plus total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) by a firm in a given year. The SOE indicator equals to one if the largest 
shareholder is government or related parties otherwise equals to zero. The main variables of 
interest are foreign sales ratios interacted with SOE indicator, 10% cut-off foreign sales ratio 
dummy interacted with SOE indicator and 25% cut-off foreign sales ratio dummy interacted with 
SOE indicator. The foreign sales ratio is calculated as the percentage of revenue from foreign 
countries on the total revenue. The 10% cut foreign sales ratio dummy equals to one if the foreign 
sales ratio is greater than 10% and equals to zero if the firm doesn’t have foreign sales. The set of 
control variables includes the natural logarithm of firm assets, the natural logarithm of one plus 
firm age at the IPO year, return on assets, Tobin’s Q, firm leverage, firm investment measured by 
capital expenditure scaled by firm assets, tangibility measured by PPE scaled by firm assets. All 
regressions include firm (industry), year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) Panel B: Ln(1+Patent All) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE* 
lag(Fsales) 
0.268* 
 
  0.061 
  
(0.161) 
 
  (0.209) 
  
nonSOE* 
lag(Fsales) 
0.399*** 
 
  0.495*** 
  
(0.131) 
 
  (0.163) 
  
SOE* 
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.354***   
 
0.390*** 
 
 
(0.068)   
 
(0.090) 
 
nonSOE* 
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.285***   
 
0.416*** 
 
 
(0.060)   
 
(0.076) 
 
SOE* 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.223*** 
  
0.183* 
  
(0.084) 
  
(0.109) 
nonSOE* 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.336*** 
  
0.462*** 
  
(0.079) 
  
(0.095) 
SOE Dummy 
-0.028 -0.064 -0.054 -0.022 -0.067 -0.054 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) 
lag(Ln(Total Assets) 0.364*** 0.349*** 0.318*** 0.444*** 0.432*** 0.401*** 
 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) 
Ln(Age) -0.240*** -0.227*** -0.223*** -0.384*** -0.371*** -0.364*** 
 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) 
lag(ROA) 0.180 0.275** 0.215 0.394** 0.464*** 0.419** 
 
(0.127) (0.137) (0.140) (0.164) (0.174) (0.177) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.050*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
lag(Leverage) -0.510*** -0.472*** -0.422*** -0.847*** -0.806*** -0.749*** 
 
(0.080) (0.083) (0.082) (0.114) (0.117) (0.115) 
85 
 
lag(CAPEX) 0.650*** 0.598*** 0.589*** 0.862*** 0.796*** 0.817*** 
 
(0.149) (0.149) (0.152) (0.191) (0.195) (0.198) 
lag(Tangibility) -0.031 -0.042 -0.027 0.057 0.025 0.029 
 
(0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.125) (0.128) (0.131) 
Constant -6.969*** -6.721*** -6.092*** -8.045*** -7.865*** -7.264*** 
 
(0.755) (0.835) (0.907) (0.847) (0.927) (0.970) 
Industry Lv2 FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 14557 12035 10378 14557 12035 10378 
adj. R-sq 0.269 0.285 0.267 0.294 0.312 0.295 
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Table 2.4: Baseline Regression of Comparing with Innovation in the U.S. 
This table reports the regressions of firm innovation on firm foreign sales and adds the US patent 
as interaction term. The dependent variable measures the number of invention patents in panel A. 
In panel B, the dependent variable measures total number of patents. The main variables of interest 
are interaction of foreign sales with US patent number. The US patent number is the industry level 
average of total number of patents in the U.S. for level 2 GICS, 24 sectors. The foreign sales ratio 
is calculated as the percentage of revenue from foreign countries on the total revenue. The MNC10 
equals to one if the foreign sales ratio is greater than 10% and equals to zero if the firm doesn’t 
have foreign sales. The measure is the same as MNC25. The set of control variables includes the 
natural logarithm of firm assets, the natural logarithm of one plus firm age at the IPO year, return 
on assets, Tobin’s Q, firm leverage, firm investment measured by capital expenditure scaled by 
firm assets, tangibility measured by PPE scaled by firm assets. All regressions include firm 
(industry), year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) Panel B: Ln (1+Patent All) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lag(Fsales)* 
lag(log(1+USPatent)) 
-0.113* 
  
-0.105 
  
(0.067) 
  
(0.079) 
  
lag(Fsales) 0.472** 
  
0.462** 
  
 
(0.187) 
  
(0.213) 
  
lag(MNC10)* 
lag(log(1+USPatent)) 
 
-0.030 
  
-0.030 
 
 
(0.031) 
  
(0.046) 
 
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.311*** 
  
0.380*** 
 
  
(0.077) 
  
(0.111) 
 
lag(MNC25)* 
lag(log(1+USPatent)) 
  
-0.012 
  
-0.023 
  
(0.038) 
  
(0.056) 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.266*** 
  
0.319** 
   
(0.095) 
  
(0.135) 
lag(log(1+USPatent)) -0.121*** -0.177*** -0.186*** -0.147*** -0.229*** -0.242*** 
 
(0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.040) 
lag(Ln(Total Assets) 0.198*** 0.300*** 0.272*** 0.197*** 0.410*** 0.385*** 
 
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Ln(Age) 0.273** -0.201*** -0.198*** 0.486*** -0.304*** -0.293*** 
 
(0.122) (0.053) (0.051) (0.142) (0.073) (0.069) 
lag(ROA) 0.064 0.346** 0.315* 0.201* 0.568*** 0.570*** 
 
(0.089) (0.163) (0.167) (0.113) (0.208) (0.212) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.011 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.006 0.087*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) 
lag(Leverage) -0.030 -0.270*** -0.210*** -0.018 -0.570*** -0.502*** 
 
(0.056) (0.081) (0.076) (0.076) (0.125) (0.121) 
lag(CAPEX) -0.038 0.351** 0.324** 0.116 0.512** 0.517** 
 
(0.096) (0.154) (0.153) (0.125) (0.209) (0.208) 
lag(Tangibility) 0.021 -0.053 -0.013 -0.016 -0.051 -0.014 
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(0.059) (0.094) (0.094) (0.082) (0.134) (0.137) 
Constant -4.135*** -5.456*** -4.859*** -4.121*** -7.135*** -6.631*** 
 
(0.844) (0.825) (0.833) (0.987) (0.985) (0.984) 
Firm FE Y N N Y N N 
Industry Lv2 FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 9143 7905 6998 9143 7905 6998 
adj. R-sq 0.136 0.251 0.237 0.119 0.265 0.251 
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Table 2.5: Regression of Competition with U.S. Innovative Environment 
This table reports the estimation of baseline regression after adding innovative environment from 
U.S. industry.  The main interested variable here is the interaction of foreign sales measurement 
with the U.S. industry level innovation. The U.S. industry average number of patents is defined in 
the Appendix and we are using the level 2 GICS/CSIC matching procedure to identify the same 
industry. To avoid potential endogenous concerns, we lagged one year of the US patent. The High 
Tech Dummy equals to one if a firm qualified the high tech requirement made by government and 
thus received benefits like tax deduction in China. The dependent variables are measures of 
innovation productivity including the number of invention patents and the total number of patents. 
The main explanatory variables are foreign sales ratios, 10% cut-off foreign sales ratio dummy and 
25% cut-off foreign sales ratio dummy. The set of control variables includes the natural logarithm 
of firm assets, the natural logarithm of one plus firm age at the IPO year, return on assets, Tobin’s 
Q, firm leverage, firm investment measured by capital expenditure scaled by firm assets, 
tangibility measured by PPE scaled by firm assets. All regressions include firm (industry), year 
fixed effect. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
High Tech Low Tech High Tech Low Tech High Tech Low Tech 
lag(Fsales)* 
lag(USPatent) 
-0.140 0.202*** 
    
(0.094) (0.076) 
    
lag(Fsales) 0.462** 0.102 
    
 
(0.232) (0.150) 
    
lag(MNC10)* 
lag(USPatent) 
  
-0.082* 0.069* 
  
  
(0.043) (0.038) 
  
lag(MNC10) 
  
0.319*** 0.158* 
  
   
(0.107) (0.086) 
  
lag(MNC25)* 
lag(USPatent) 
    
-0.097* 0.104** 
    
(0.054) (0.047) 
lag(MNC25) 
    
0.326** 0.106 
     
(0.137) (0.098) 
lag(USPatent) -0.210*** -0.040 -0.198*** -0.052 -0.257*** -0.035 
 
(0.053) (0.033) (0.060) (0.035) (0.063) (0.035) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
0.357*** 0.286*** 0.350*** 0.267*** 0.334*** 0.229*** 
(0.041) (0.051) (0.043) (0.054) (0.044) (0.056) 
Ln(Age) -0.099 -0.151** -0.110 -0.164*** -0.101 -0.168*** 
 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068) (0.059) 
lag(ROA) 0.396 0.065 0.394 0.158 0.435 0.127 
 
(0.270) (0.159) (0.282) (0.166) (0.293) (0.170) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.075*** 0.053*** 0.094*** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) 
lag(Leverage) -0.372*** -0.203** -0.352*** -0.167** -0.252* -0.131* 
 
(0.132) (0.082) (0.136) (0.080) (0.140) (0.075) 
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lag(CAPEX) 0.476* 0.214 0.368 0.241 0.379 0.192 
 
(0.246) (0.183) (0.254) (0.178) (0.261) (0.170) 
lag(Tangibility) -0.241* 0.150 -0.216 0.073 -0.176 0.098 
 
(0.139) (0.103) (0.141) (0.101) (0.149) (0.101) 
Constant -6.582*** -5.628*** -6.531*** -5.211*** -6.080*** -4.445*** 
 
(0.918) (1.052) (0.971) (1.111) (0.995) (1.145) 
Industry Lv2 FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4172 4740 3533 4175 3040 3774 
adj. R-sq 0.266 0.230 0.288 0.238 0.282 0.226 
 
  Panel B: Ln(1+Patent All) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
High Tech Low Tech High Tech Low Tech High Tech Low Tech 
lag(Fsales)* 
lag(USPatent) 
-0.233* 0.298** 
    
(0.121) (0.122) 
    
lag(Fsales) 0.596** -0.149 
    
 
(0.285) (0.247) 
    
lag(MNC10)* 
lag(USPatent) 
  
-0.118* 0.128** 
  
  
(0.060) (0.062) 
  
lag(MNC10) 
  
0.435*** 0.111 
  
   
(0.144) (0.139) 
  
lag(MNC25)* 
lag(USPatent) 
    
-0.163** 0.165** 
    
(0.071) (0.078) 
lag(MNC25) 
    
0.470*** 0.013 
     
(0.176) (0.164) 
lag(USPatent) -0.340*** 0.012 -0.303*** -0.021 -0.374*** -0.010 
 
(0.069) (0.048) (0.075) (0.053) (0.080) (0.053) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
0.462*** 0.406*** 0.446*** 0.390*** 0.429*** 0.361*** 
(0.050) (0.059) (0.052) (0.063) (0.052) (0.065) 
Ln(Age) -0.170* -0.195** -0.203** -0.202** -0.182** -0.204** 
 
(0.093) (0.087) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) 
lag(ROA) 0.620* 0.407* 0.495 0.438* 0.543 0.462* 
 
(0.346) (0.218) (0.339) (0.233) (0.347) (0.239) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.060** 0.078*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.029) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) 
lag(Leverage) -0.611*** -0.523*** -0.567*** -0.510*** -0.462** -0.472*** 
 
(0.186) (0.141) (0.184) (0.145) (0.187) (0.145) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.680** 0.353 0.553* 0.411* 0.630* 0.372 
 
(0.313) (0.243) (0.319) (0.243) (0.322) (0.235) 
lag(Tangibility) -0.382** 0.275* -0.405** 0.190 -0.360* 0.198 
 
(0.186) (0.157) (0.185) (0.158) (0.197) (0.161) 
Constant -7.887*** -7.921*** -7.673*** -7.555*** -7.214*** -6.971*** 
 
(1.094) (1.247) (1.139) (1.328) (1.137) (1.380) 
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Industry Lv2 FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4172 4740 3533 4175 3040 3774 
adj. R-sq 0.309 0.223 0.329 0.234 0.324 0.221 
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Multivariate Regression  
This table reports the diagnostics and results of the DiD regressions designed for testing on how a 
plausibly exogenous shock to foreign sales due to the passage of the Exchange Rate Reform in 
2005 affects firm innovation. Sample selection begins with all firms with non-missing variables 
and observation outcomes in the three years before exchange rate reform (2003-2005) and three 
years after exchange rate reform (2006-2008). Treatment group includes the firms with foreign 
sales and influenced by the exchange rate reform. Control group is the firms without foreign sales 
thus would not influenced by the exchange rate reform. We run the multivariate DiD test results 
with standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. All regressions include firm (industry), year 
fixed effect. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) Panel B: Ln(1+Patent All) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ExPolicy* 
lag(Fsales) 
0.317*** 
  
0.392*** 
  
(0.122) 
  
(0.149) 
  
lag(Fsales) 0.057 
  
0.054 
  
 
(0.139) 
  
(0.160) 
  
Expolicy* 
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.162*** 
  
0.267*** 
 
 
(0.057) 
  
(0.078) 
 
lag(MNC10) 
 
0.144** 
  
0.144* 
 
 
 
(0.056) 
  
(0.086) 
 
Expolicy* 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.228*** 
  
0.402*** 
  
(0.077) 
  
(0.102) 
lag(MNC25) 
  
0.103 
  
0.017 
 
  
(0.069) 
  
(0.097) 
ExPolicy 0.105** 0.051 0.046 0.089 0.027 0.010 
 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.050) (0.064) (0.065) (0.069) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
0.196*** 0.311*** 0.289*** 0.195*** 0.432*** 0.412*** 
(0.044) (0.048) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) 
Ln(Age) 0.237 -0.201*** -0.190*** 0.466** -0.286*** -0.271*** 
 
(0.154) (0.065) (0.064) (0.182) (0.086) (0.084) 
lag(ROA) -0.007 0.238 0.217 0.093 0.424* 0.437* 
 
(0.108) (0.171) (0.173) (0.144) (0.232) (0.236) 
lag(Tobin's Q) -0.001 0.080*** 0.074*** -0.012 0.106*** 0.102*** 
 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) 
lag(Leverage) -0.101 -0.287*** -0.227** -0.153* -0.641*** -0.576*** 
 
(0.068) (0.093) (0.090) (0.089) (0.137) (0.134) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.045 0.355** 0.304* 0.236 0.527** 0.520** 
 
(0.116) (0.170) (0.175) (0.161) (0.238) (0.245) 
lag(Tangibility) 0.047 -0.094 -0.065 0.091 -0.115 -0.079 
 
(0.070) (0.101) (0.104) (0.102) (0.146) (0.150) 
Constant -4.297*** -5.856*** -5.461*** -4.454*** -7.885*** -7.533*** 
 
(0.909) (0.979) (1.035) (1.131) (1.119) (1.153) 
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Firm FE Y N N Y N N 
Industry Lv2 FE N Y Y N Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 6009 5254 4669 6009 5254 4669 
adj. R-sq 0.089 0.225 0.212 0.070 0.245 0.235 
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Regression after Adding Propensity 
Score Matching  
This table reports the diagnostics and results of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and DiD 
regressions designed for testing on how a plausibly exogenous shock to foreign sales due to the 
passage of the Exchange Rate Reform in 2005 affects firm innovation. We only keep the sample by 
using the PSM method by selecting purely domestic firms with similar characteristics with 
multinational firms by each year. TMNC10 and TMNC25 measure the foreign sales in the 
treatment group after selecting and matching the sample with the rest. TMNC10 equals to one if 
the firm in the treatment group have more than 10% foreign sales ratio and equals to zero if the 
firm is in the control group without any foreign sales; same as TMNC25, changing the cut-off ratio 
from 10% to 25%. We run the subsample test results with standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering. All regressions include industry and year fixed effect. The controls remain the same. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Pre-ExPolicy (ExPolicy=0) Post-ExPolicy (ExPolicy=1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ln(1+Patent1) Ln(1+Patent All) Ln(1+Patent1) Ln(1+Patent All) 
TMNC10 0.177*** 
 
0.174**   0.274*** 
 
0.380*** 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.086)   (0.058) 
 
(0.077) 
 TMNC25 
 
0.133* 
 
0.043 
 
0.301*** 
 
0.388*** 
  
(0.070) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.099) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
0.307*** 0.288*** 0.452*** 0.433*** 0.317*** 0.308*** 0.425*** 0.404*** 
(0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.066) (0.046) (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) 
Ln(Age) -0.092 -0.066 -0.104 -0.109 -0.324*** -0.350*** -0.489*** -0.504*** 
 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.089) (0.113) (0.112) 
lag(ROA) 0.169 0.100 0.209 0.198 0.513** 0.597** 0.758** 0.950*** 
 
(0.235) (0.218) (0.363) (0.337) (0.227) (0.256) (0.316) (0.350) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.046) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) 
lag(Leverage) -0.318*** -0.207** -0.709*** -0.534*** -0.268** -0.158 -0.585*** -0.442*** 
 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.176) (0.174) (0.120) (0.129) (0.159) (0.166) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.377 0.387 0.542 0.535 0.394 0.211 0.519 0.484 
 
(0.248) (0.244) (0.333) (0.330) (0.251) (0.257) (0.337) (0.349) 
lag(Tangibility) -0.067 -0.114 -0.022 -0.073 -0.136 -0.074 -0.206 -0.150 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.170) (0.170) (0.118) (0.128) (0.171) (0.185) 
Constant -6.108*** -5.774*** -8.799*** -8.414*** -5.564*** -5.375*** -7.128*** -6.717*** 
 
(1.145) (1.263) (1.335) (1.403) (1.013) (1.163) (1.180) (1.269) 
Industry Lv2 
FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2408 2150 2408 2150 2739 2314 2739 2314 
adj. R-sq 0.180 0.165 0.193 0.187 0.223 0.226 0.258 0.257 
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Table 2.8: 2SLS regression result for two instrumental variables 
This table reports the comparison of the OLS regressions and 2SLS regression result. There are 
two instrumental variables using, one is the cumulative number of BITs (Bilateral Investment 
Treaty), another one is the change of percentage export weighted by number of new sign BITs. The 
main interested variable is still the foreign sales ratio. Panel A reports the result for depedent 
variable used as patent type 1 and Panel B reports the result for dependent variable used as all 
patent types. We run the subsample test results with standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering. All regressions include industry and year fixed effect. The controls remain the same. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Ln(1+Patent1) 
  
OLS 
2SLS_Cumlative Number 
of BITs 
2SLS_Export Weighted 
Number of BITs 
(1) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
Ln(1+Pat
ent1) 
lag(Fsales) 
(1
st
 Stage) 
Ln(1+Pate
nt1) 
lag(Fsales)  
(1
st
 Stage) 
Ln(1+Patent1
) 
lag(Fsales) 0.290** 
    
  (0.113) 
    
Num_Treaty 
 
0.484*** 
 
0.051*** 
 
  
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.019) 
 
lag(Fsales)_Hat 
  
  
4.955*** 
 
5.776*** 
  
(0.392) 
 
(1.257) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
  
0.240*** -0.009*** 0.386*** 0.000 0.386*** 
(0.036) (0.002) (0.035) (0.002) (0.035) 
Ln(Age) 0.461*** -0.042*** -0.041 -0.002 -0.033 
  (0.114) (0.005) (0.043) (0.004) (0.042) 
lag(ROA) -0.148** 0.065*** 0.052 0.090*** -0.013 
  (0.075) (0.025) (0.150) (0.025) (0.201) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.016** -0.009*** 0.091*** -0.003*** 0.093*** 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.012) 
lag(Leverage) -0.106* 0.032*** -0.494*** 0.014 -0.513*** 
  (0.055) (0.011) (0.078) (0.011) (0.082) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.023 0.039 0.234 0.067*** 0.165 
  (0.093) (0.024) (0.154) (0.025) (0.179) 
lag(Tangibility) 0.080 -0.022** 0.086 -0.032*** 0.125 
  (0.061) (0.009) (0.093) (0.009) (0.099) 
Constant -5.518*** -1.908*** -8.107*** 0.086** -8.198*** 
  (0.750) (0.104) (0.712) (0.040) (0.778) 
Industry Lv2 FE Y N Y N Y 
Year FE Y N Y N Y 
Hausman Test            
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
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N 14598 10784 10792 10784 10792 
adj. R-sq 0.158 0.039 0.248 0.004 0.223 
 
Panel B: Ln(1+PatentAll) 
  
OLS 
2SLS_Cumlative Number 
of BITs 
2SLS_Export Weighted 
Number of BITs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(1+Paten
tAll) 
lag(Fsales) 
(1
st
 Stage) 
Ln(1+Paten
tAll) 
lag(Fsales) 
(1
st
 Stage) 
Ln(1+PatentAll
) 
lag(Fsales) 0.264**         
  (0.124)         
Num_Treaty   0.484***   0.051***   
    (0.025)   (0.019)   
lag(Fsales)_Ha
t     6.326***   4.492*** 
      (0.549)   (1.600) 
lag(Ln(Total 
Assets) 
  
0.259*** -0.009*** 0.496*** 0.000 0.495*** 
(0.039) (0.002) (0.040) (0.002) (0.039) 
Ln(Age) 0.647*** -0.042*** -0.102* -0.002 -0.095* 
  (0.130) (0.005) (0.056) (0.004) (0.056) 
lag(ROA) -0.116 0.065*** 0.284 0.090*** 0.465* 
  (0.091) (0.025) (0.195) (0.025) (0.249) 
lag(Tobin's Q) 0.015* -0.009*** 0.109*** -0.003*** 0.101*** 
  (0.008) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.015) 
lag(Leverage) -0.126* 0.032*** -0.854*** 0.014 -0.840*** 
  (0.072) (0.011) (0.116) (0.011) (0.119) 
lag(CAPEX) 0.075 0.039 0.369* 0.067*** 0.473** 
  (0.114) (0.024) (0.200) (0.025) (0.231) 
lag(Tangibility) 0.084 -0.022** 0.154 -0.032*** 0.114 
  (0.076) (0.009) (0.129) (0.009) (0.135) 
Constant -5.881*** -1.908*** -10.035*** 0.086** -9.851*** 
  (0.835) (0.104) (0.793) (0.040) (0.867) 
Industry Lv2 
FE Y N Y N Y 
Year FE Y N Y N Y 
Hausman Test            
  
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
N 14598 10784 10792 10784 10792 
adj. R-sq 0.147 0.039 0.268 0.004 0.245 
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Abstract 
 
We investigate informal financing such as accounts receivable and payable of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China. The volume of informal 
financing dramatically increased and non-SOEs significantly more rely on them 
than SOEs. SOEs with abundance of liquidity or during financial crisis are able to 
provide informal financing to non-SOEs. Fast growing firms do not seem to rely 
more on informal financing. Our research highlights the importance of informal 
financing and ownership structures in emerging markets. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Informal financing plays important role in corporations especially in the 
sectors with financing constraints. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) show 
that US firms especially SMEs rely heavily on trade credit when formal debt 
financing is not available. China, the largest emerging market, has witnessed a 
rapid growth despite of its weak institutions and informal financing plays 
important role in economic growth (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2007). Trade credit has 
been shown to facilitate firm growth in emerging markets. Fisman and Raturi 
(2004) and Fabbri and Klapper (2009) show that financially constrained firms rely 
on trade credit to expand sales. China with its unique legal and financial system 
thus becomes an ideal setting to examine the role of trade finance in corporations. 
In fact, it has been a puzzle why China achieves incredible economic growth with 
a relatively less developed financial market
25
 and low efficient banking system 
(Cull and Xu, 2003). In this paper, we try to shed new lights on the role of trade 
credit to support firm financing and growth in China. In particular, we focus on 
the liquidity provision of trade credit such as accounts payable and receivable 
among firms in China.   
King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that 
financial development is important in explaining economic growth as financial 
                                                             
25 Allen, Qian and Qian find that informal financing through private relationship supports 
entrepreneurial activities in Chinese private sectors. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2010) on the other hand argue that formal financing provided by banks support firm growth.  
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development reduces external financing cost. Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic 
(2001), Biais & Gollier (1997), Frank & Maksimovic (2004) state that the use of 
trade credit is influenced by the development of a country’s legal and financial 
system. Cull, Xu and Zhu (2009) find that poorly performing SOEs tend to 
redistribute credit to other SOEs with less privileged access to loans via trade 
credit, and they attribute this phenomenon to a substitution effect of trade credit 
for loans. We hypothesize that non-SOEs rely more on trade credit compared to 
SOEs. Jain (2001) suggests that trade creditor plays a role as the second layer 
between financial intermediaries (here mainly banks) and borrowers. Frank & 
Maksimovic (2004) also indicate this special second layer role is helpful for both 
suppliers and buyers to reduce their needs for external finance, especially in 
inefficient financial market and market where suppliers have more power. Since in 
Chinese market, the financial market is not efficient and often SOEs have great 
power over suppliers, it makes China the ideal setting to study the trade credit as 
an important source of informal financing. Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011) 
show that the use of trade credit depends on bank-firm relationship, SOEs are 
shown to have preferential access to formal bank loans, SOEs therefore can 
become intermediary by providing trade credit to other firms especially non-SOEs 
in need of liquidity. 
In financial crisis, most firms face liquidity problem due to the breakdown 
of lending market and capital market in general. Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) show that US large firms with high liquidity extend 
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informal financing to those needing them more. Fabbri and Klapper (2009) find 
that firms with more liquidity during financial crisis increase trade credit to their 
suppliers. Following the breakout of financial crisis starting in 2008, many 
Chinese firms face a negative liquidity shock, and non-SOEs will be greatly 
affected than SOEs. SOEs therefore may increase the provision of trade credit 
during the financial crisis to non-SOEs or those needing liquidity greatly.  
We aim to understand the informal financing market in China by 
systematically examining listed firms’ usage of trade credit, with proxies as 
accounts receivables and accounts payables. Accounts receivable is used as a 
proxy for how much a firm as a supplier lend its customer, while accounts payable 
is a proxy for how much a firm borrow from its supplier. Those two variables 
therefore capture both sides of trade credit relationship between firms regarding 
their supplier/customer financing.  
We find that non-SOEs experience significantly greater level of accounting 
payables than SOEs. This is suggestive of the greater reliance of non-SOEs for 
liquidity that is provided by SOEs. Similarly, non-SOEs also have significantly 
greater level of accounts receivables than SOEs, indicating that non-SOEs seem to 
provide more trade credit for their customers. Overall, trade credit has a 
significantly greater role for non-SOEs than for SOEs. Cross-sectional evidence 
on firms shows that non-SOEs with low liquidity have significantly greater level 
of accounts payables and receivables, confirming our prior findings that they need 
more trade credit. We further explore whether growth firms rely more on trade 
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finance than firms with slow growth especially for non-SOEs. The evidence 
however shows that growth firms rely less on trade finance.      
We exploit the reliance of trade credit for firms by using a natural 
experiment – global financial crisis. This setting allows us to draw causality 
inference. We find that non-SOEs during financial crisis experience significantly 
higher level of accounts payables and receivables. This evidence suggests that 
SOEs do rely heavily on trade finance of both credit and debt.  
Our research sheds new lights on the proliferation of trade finance in 
China and how firms especially SOEs help intermediate by providing trade credit 
to non-SOEs, especially SOEs with high level of liquidity or SOEs during the 
financial crisis. This is consistent with the observation of Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (2001) that it is out of control of firms to improve macroeconomic 
factors. Therefore firms especially those with difficult access to formal financing 
such as loans, e.g., non-SOEs to rely more on informal financing such as trade 
credit in their capital structure, similar to the conclusion of Guariglia & Mateut 
(2006) in the sense that trade credit is extended by firms during tight monetary 
period. Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2001) claim that in a country with 
imperfect financial system, firms can suffer financial access limitation easily so 
that the source of funds needed is shifted to suppliers who are non-financial 
institutions. In our setting, we provide supporting empirical evidence to their 
prediction by showing that SOEs supply trade credit to non-SOEs.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
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hypotheses and specifies the empirical regression models. Section 3 summarizes 
the data and sample statistics. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
3.2. Hypothesis and Empirical Specifications 
Petersen & Rajan (1997) suggest that trade finance is used by firms who 
cannot easily get financial support from traditional channels even it costs more 
than bank credit. This description applies to non-SOEs since they depend more on 
trade credits financing because Chinese banking system favors SOEs. As a result, 
they value trade liquidity position more than their SOEs counterpart. SOEs, on the 
other side generally access trade credit less in China since they have advantage of 
banking system and public capital raising activities. Besides, cash-poor non-SOEs 
rely more on this kind of financing since they have the most several moral hazard 
and asymmetric information and are least to obtain liquidity through formal 
financing channels. 
Hypothesis 1: non-SOEs more involved in trade credit financing and less 
liquid non-SOEs rely more on this informal financing from lending activities. 
Our basic specification can be written as 
1 2
3
4 5
( )it it ij i it
i it
it jt ijt
AR AP non SOE CashLiq
non SOE CashLiq
X X
  

  
   
  
  
 (1) 
In equation (1), ( )it itAR AP  refers the total amount of account receivables 
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(account payables) scaled by total sales in supplier’s balance sheet.26 inon SOE  
is a dummy variable equals to one if suppliers are non-SOE firms. itCashLiq
denotes that suppliers cash liquidity positions measured as cash and cash 
equivalents plus marketable securities scaled by total assets. The interaction term 
captures how many credits non-SOEs used when they are liquid. Our focus lies on 
the coefficient of non-SOE dummy and its interaction term. According to our 
main hypotheses, the coefficient of non-SOE dummy should be positive while the 
coefficient of interaction term should be negative. 
Moreover, we also want to examine how those firms act when other 
sources of external finance are scarce during crisis. Many theories argue that 
customers resort to trade credit when bank markets are in trouble. (Biais and 
Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) When liquidity dries up, customers 
prefer to finance themselves through trade credits. SOEs are usually regards as 
less financial constrained and their liquidity are relatively unrestricted during the 
crisis. SOE suppliers are able to extend trade credit to their customers since they 
have an advantage to overcome moral hazard and asymmetric information 
frictions with respect to banks. Our second hypothesis is that SOEs and high 
liquid firms are more willing to provide trade credits to their clients during crisis. 
So they increase lending levels when their main customers are in trouble with 
financing.  
Hypothesis 2: During Crisis, SOE firms as well as high liquid firms 
                                                             
26
 We also use total assets to be scalar and the result is robust.  
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increase trade credit provision 
To test this hypothesis, we add crisis and its interaction terms into the basic 
specification: 
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8
( )it it ij i it t
i it i t
t it it jt ijt
AR AP SOE CashLiq Crisis
SOE CashLiq SOE Crisis
Crisis CashLiq X X
   
 
   
   
   
       (2)
 
The indicator variable Crisis takes value of one during the financial crisis, 
specifically from the year 2008 to the year 2009 and it witness the drop of other 
external finance following the onset of the crisis. Its interaction term with 
non-SOE dummy captures how much non-SOE are willing to provide trade credits 
during the crisis and its interaction term with liquidity shows whether high liquid 
firms are ready to use liquidity during the crisis. Based on our hypothesis, we 
predict that the coefficient of Crisis is negative and these two interactions should 
be also both negative. The interaction of non-SOE with liquidity term measures 
the level of high liquid non-SOEs in the crisis.  
In our models we include controls variables for xit, the supply side of firm, 
and also control for demand side, xjt. Supply side includes supplier’s size, age, 
investment properties and fixed investment, net profit margin, sales growth, net 
worth, total debt and Tobin’s q and demand side includes size, investment 
properties and fixed investment, net profit margin, sales growth, net worth and 
total debt (See Garcia-Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). Similarly, we 
introduce the ratio of accounts receivable used by customer j to total sales of 
supplier i, which measures the account receivables weights of each customer. 
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Interfirm is an indicator takes one when supplier lend its own firms or totally 
control firms. We scale all liquidity measures and firms variables by total assets. 
All variable definition and construction can be seen in Appendix. 
 
3.3. Data Description, Variable Definition and 
Summary Statistics 
Our sample consists of all China-incorporated firms from A-share, main 
board market. We only include the main board market because the Growing 
Enterprise Market (GEM) started from 2009 and has very short historical data. We 
exclude financial and utility firms since they have different disclosure regulations 
and their liquidity measures or positions are different from other firms. Our main 
variables and firm characteristics data are obtained from the Chinese Stock 
Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) for the period from 1999 to 2013. The 
sample period is chosen to match the availability of listed firms’ financial 
statements (cash flow statements) in the CSMAR database, as CSMAR starts 
collecting cash flow statements data from 1998. We drop off delisted firms within 
our sample period.  We also use balance sample to avoid new listing effect, 
especially after the year 2007 when SME in SSE opened. Considering the impact 
of extreme value and outliers, we winsorize all firm characteristics at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. The whole sample consists of 18,829 firm-year observations with 
1,874 firms while the balance sample consists of 10,200 firm-year observations 
with 680 firms. 
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We collect information about firms’ key customers using notes of annual 
financial statement in WIND. According to CSRC Statements of Listed Company 
Information Disclosure No. 15, listed firms are required to disclose the amount of 
five main customers in annual report and encourage reporting the name of the 
main customers. But due to some reasons, plenty of firms do not disclose it. So we 
obtain the information of supplier-customer from WIND and search the customers’ 
names within the database to obtain financial statement for the suppliers. The 
main advantage of doing so is that the results are based on supplier-customer pair 
and we can test dependent variables by controlling both supplier and customer 
factors. However, the matched sample has some limitation. The main drawback is 
that the data only disclosure the five main customers of each supplier, so supplier 
especially for those large firms with various customers do not disclose some of 
their most important customers. Secondly, CSRC just recommend not required to 
disclose the name of customers, many suppliers do not report their customer 
names in account receivables. Even if they disclose the names they cannot be fully 
matched due to the abbreviation problem. We are unable to find matches for many 
customer firms -- for example, small unlisted firms, foreign firms, firms which 
lack financial statements in the WIND database. Finally, we have about 3,450 
non-missing values in all relevant variables and used in the regression analyses. 
Table 1 contains key descriptive statistic for unmatched and matched sample. The 
matched sample is about 18% of the whole unmatched sample. 
Table 1 present the summary statistics of main variables used in unbalance 
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sample and balance sample respectively. From both samples, we can see non-SOE 
firms usually are smaller, younger, rely more on trade credits, less fixed 
investment, less net profit and more investment opportunities. As for balance 
sample, non-SOE firms are also likely to have less net worth capability and lower 
leveraged. But the cash liquidity is different for these two samples: unbalance 
sample show that non-SOE have more cash while balance sample show the 
opposite. One of the potential reasons is that new listing (IPO) firms after 2007 
are mainly non-SOE in Small and Median Enterprise (SME) and they will bring 
more cash holding for non-SOE than SOE.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 plots the average of accounts receivable and accounts payable in 
two samples. From the figure we can see that the trade credits grow fast during 
our sample period, especially after the year 2008. Non-SOEs have lower mean 
level of trade credits than SOEs but the ratio of these trade credits are much higher 
as shown in Table 1 since their size and sales are much smaller than SOEs. Panel 
A shows that mean level of accounts receivable is quite stable before the year 
2008 for the whole sample. But after financial crisis, the number booms up to over 
double in the year 2013 and SOEs increase larger than Non-SOEs. From the 
perspective of accounts payable, we do not witness this sudden rise around 
financial crisis in Panel B. The average level of accounts payable continuous 
grows from below 200 million RMB for both types of firms to over 1200 million 
RMB for SOE firms and to over 400 million RMB for Non-SOEs. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1. Baseline Regression: Determinants of Trade Credit  
The empirical analysis starts the regression estimation of the basic 
specification of Eq. (1) with full samples controlling for supplier’s firm liquidity 
characteristics. The balance sample is used to avoid unexpected cash inflows after 
new listing. Both balance and unbalance sample has the advantage of 
representativeness, they provide motivations for the rest of our analysis. The result 
is shown in Table 2. For each sample, the dependent variables we used are 
accounts receivable in first two columns and accounts payables in last two 
columns. We focus on our attention on first main hypothesis: non-SOEs rely more 
on trade credits (the coefficient of non-SOE dummy) and less liquid non-SOEs 
rely even more than the rest (the coefficient of the interaction term). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The Columns 1 and 2 use accounts receivable to sales as dependent 
variable in complete sample. The coefficient of non-SOE dummy is significantly 
positive and implies that the fraction of account receivables to sales in average 
non-SOEs are 6.3% higher than that in average SOEs in column 1. The economic 
magnitude of non-SOE dummy in column 2 is 6.1% (0.087-0.141*0.187) .The 
interaction term of cash liquidity with SOE dummy is significantly negative. This 
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support our main hypothesis that each decrease of ratio of cash reserves to total 
assets in non-SOEs implies an mean decreases fraction of accounts receivable to 
sales by 14% percentage on yearly basis. As for accounts payable, the coefficient 
of non-SOE dummy are still significantly positive as shown in columns 3 and 4. 
But the magnitude of the dummy is much smaller compared with that of accounts 
receivable and the interaction term with cash liquidity is negative but insignificant. 
This result highlights that non-SOEs rely more on trade credits especially for 
lending activities (accounts receivable) and non-SOEs with less liquid are more 
likely to balance their liquidity position using account receivables from their 
customers rather than borrowers. 
Next regression uses balanced sample to avoid the new listing effect. In 
column 5 and 6, the coefficient of non-SOE dummy is still significantly positive 
and the magnitude is greater than that in unbalance sample. The coefficient of the 
interaction term in column 6 is more significantly positive compared with that in 
column 2, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Besides, the coefficient of 
non-SOE dummy is marginally significant and its interaction is no longer 
significant if the dependent variable is accounts payable, even though the sign of 
the coefficients are the same. It supports our hypothesis much stronger. 
Regarding the control variables, our results suggest that firms that have 
more access to outside financing offer an average more trade credit. The 
coefficients of cash liquidity and size are negative, which shows that firms with 
larger scale and more cash holding are in the good liquidity position decrease the 
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usage of trade credits to both their customers and suppliers. Having controlled for 
size and cash liquidity position, we find a negative but not significant coefficient 
for age, suggesting that long established firms with more reputation access less 
trade credits, which is consistent with Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011). 
Besides, we find that firms with lower net profit margins and smaller ratios of 
fixed investment and investment properties to total assets use more trade credit 
and it is also consistent Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011). The coefficient of 
sales growth is negative, suggesting that firms with low growth can maintain their 
sales using extension of trade credit. This finding is consistent with Petersen and 
Rajan (1997). Finally, inconsistent with Garcia-Appendini, Montoriol-Garriga 
(2013), we find that firms with higher ratios of net worth to assets and leverage 
lend more to their customers, possibly because they have better access of formal 
financing channels from bank or other outside markets. The coefficients are just 
opposite when firms as borrower. Firms with fewer banks dependent are in a 
better liquidity position use less account payables from their suppliers. 
Table 3 explores two important reasons for firms use trade credits: sales 
maintenance reasons and macroeconomics reasons.  We use the growth of gross 
domestic product (GDP) as a proxy of macroeconomics condition.  From Table 3, 
we see that high sales growth dummy is negative and significant for all columns, 
suggesting that firms do use trade credit as a market tool to maintain their higher 
sales. It is consistent with finding of Emery (1984) and Wilson & Summers (2002) 
but not with Petersen & Rajan (1997). The interaction term of high sales growth 
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dummy with non-SOE dummy is negative but only significant when accounts 
receivable as dependent variable, which shows that non-SOE firms use this 
marketing strategy to maintain their relation between customers in order to 
increase their sales. As for macroeconomics condition, the coefficient of high 
GDP growth dummy and its interaction with non-SOE dummy is all negative 
when accounts receivable as dependent variable, all positive when accounts 
payable as dependent variable. However, they are no longer significant except for 
the interaction term when accounts payable is dependent variable in balance 
sample. It means that firms decrease accounts receivable but increase accounts 
payable when there is a decrease in macroeconomic in firms as firm’s ability of 
obtaining bank credit is limited. This explanation supports Huyghebaert (2006), 
Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano (2010b) and Niskanen & Niskanen (2006) 
which firms offer less trade credit to customers and use more trade credit from 
borrowers during high developed macroeconomic situation, especially for those 
non-SOEs. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.4.2. Determinants of Trade Credit during Crisis  
We test our second hypothesis by examining firms as liquidity providers 
when the other sources of external finance are scarce. We present the results using 
firm’s accounts receivable to sales as dependent variable in Table 4. The 
coefficient of crisis dummy is negative and significant in all cases, suggesting that 
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ratio of accounts receivable to sales drop from 7.7% to 15% during the crisis. We 
focus our attention on the three different interaction terms: interaction of crisis 
dummy with liquidity position; interaction of crisis with non-SOE dummy; and 
interaction of liquidity with non-SOE dummy. The first interaction is positive and 
significant with its coefficient about 28%. So the economic magnitude for crisis 
dummy with liquidity is more than 5%, which means high liquidity firms will 
offer 5% more accounts receivables to sales to maintain their customer’s liquidity 
level during the crisis. Secondly, we see that the coefficient of crisis dummy with 
non-SOE dummy is significantly negative, suggesting that non-SOE firms use 6% 
less trade credits during crisis on the yearly basis. Finally, the coefficient of 
liquidity interacted with non-SOE dummy is also strongly negative which is 
similar with the result shown in Table 2. These results consistently support our 
second hypothesis that high-liquid and SOE firms as suppliers provide liquidity 
though trade credits channel during the crisis. Table 5 tests this specification using 
the balanced data.  We see that the coefficients of crisis dummy as well as these 
three interaction terms are still significantly and the sign is same in Table 4. 
Besides, these effects are much stronger and the magnitudes are bigger in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 4&5 here] 
Table 6 reports the regression with accounts payable to sales as dependent 
variable during the crisis. From Table 6, we see that the coefficient of crisis 
dummy is consistently negative but no longer as significant as before, indicating 
that firms use slightly less borrowing through trade credits during crisis. Besides, 
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none of these three interactions are significant and the signs of interactions are all 
negative. In sum, the result for firms as customers is much weaker than the result 
for firms as suppliers. It also strengths our first hypothesis that non-SOE do not 
usually use this informal financing from lending activities even during the crisis 
when limited rationing exists in financing markets. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
3.4.3 Determinants of Trade Credit: Supplier-Customer Relations  
One of the main concerning factors of the baseline regression is that we 
cannot directly control for demand side effects. The previous results can be driven 
by the demand for trade credits, which leads supplier to offer trade credits for 
customers. To rule out this demand driven factor, we run the regression of Eq(1) 
by introducing  customer firms characteristics. In this sample, each observation 
is a supplier – customer pair. Therefore, we can control for the demand of trade 
credits by time invariant supplier-customer pairs fixed effect. This matched 
sample allows us to verify whether suppliers of SOEs extend trade credits is 
forced by their customer’s demand. 
Table 7 report the result for this matched sample. The first four column use 
accounts receivable to sales as dependent variable to exam trade credits from the 
supplier firms to customer firms, while the last three column use accounts payable 
as dependent variable to test trade credits from the opposite direction. Column 1 
contains the baseline regression in table 2 with controls for both supplier and 
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customer characteristics. Consistently with our main hypothesis, we find that the 
interaction term of cash liquidity with supplier non-SOE dummy is negative but 
not significant. The insignificance may due to the limited observation of matched 
sample.  In Columns 2 and 3, we explore this effect during the financial crisis. 
The coefficient for crisis dummy is significantly negative, suggesting that firms 
use less trade credits when external financing situations are limited for both 
suppliers and customers. When all the interaction terms are introduced in column 
3, the magnitude of crisis dummy is much bigger and the coefficient of interaction 
terms are negative except for the interaction of crisis with cash liquidity position.  
It is consistent with result in Table 3 but we do not find it to be significant.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Most importantly, the coefficient of interaction term of cash liquidity with 
supplier non-SOE changes to be positive in column 4, suggesting that non-SOE is 
receiving some trade credit from other firms. However, the magnitude of the 
interaction is only 5% and it is not significant. In column 5 , we show that the 
crisis dummy is negative but not significant, which indicating that the borrowing 
activity of customer from supplier is decreasing but not so much during the crisis. 
But when we control for the interaction term in column 6 as what we did in Table 
5, we observe that the coefficient of cash liquidity with non-SOE dummy is still 
positive but not significant and the magnitude is much bigger than in column 4. 
This matched sample may indicate that non-SOE firms are receiving trade credits 
while SOE firms are providing these informal financing if we control for 
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supplier-customer pair effects. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
China is an ideal setting to understand the role of informal financing or 
growth. We systematically study the use of trade finance by corporations in China 
according to ownership structure. Chinese financial market is not well developed 
and market friction can plague non-SOEs due to the discrimination of lending and 
state control of banks. Since non-SOEs often have difficulty in accessing loans or 
even the equity market, trade finance especially credit can be an important source 
of funds for their capital structure. We empirically show that non-SOEs rely 
significantly greater than SOEs on trade credit. Cross sectional evidence shows 
that the reliance of trade credit is stronger for non-SOEs with low liquidity. 
Further, we utilize the recent financial crisis as an exogenous shock to firm 
liquidity and find that non-SOEs experience an increase in trade credit during the 
financial crisis. Our evidence also supports a substitution hypothesis between 
formal and informal debt such as trade credit. Non-SOEs do not show strong 
reliance on trade credit but also they seem to provide trade finance to support their 
revenues. Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs exhibit significantly higher level of 
accounts receivable, especially those with low leverage ratio.  
Our paper highlights the important role of institutions, ownership and 
financial market in determining the use of trade finance by corporations. Our 
paper highlights the important role of institutions, ownership and financial market 
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in determining the use of trade finance by corporations. The evidence suggests 
that firms rely on credit trade, an important of informal financing for liquidity 
provision among themselves especially during 2008 global financial crisis.  
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Appendix 3.A: Variable Definition and Construction 
 
Variables  Definition Source 
Account Receivables   Annual net account receivables CSMAR 
Account Payables   Annual net account payables  CSMAR 
Cash Liquidity  Cash and cash equivalent plus marketable securities 
divided by the book value of total assets 
CSMAR 
Size  Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets  CSMAR 
Age  Year since firm established. CSMAR 
Fixed Investment and 
Investing Property  
 Net value of fixed investment and net value of investing 
property
27
. 
CSMAR 
Net Profit Margin  Net profit divided by total sales. CSMAR 
Net Worth  Difference between total assets and total liabilities CSMAR 
Total Debt  Sum of short-term debt and long-term debt CSMAR 
Total Sales Growth  Firm level annual total sales growth rate. CSMAR 
Q  Book value of total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity scaled by book value of total 
assets. 
CSMAR 
Non-SOE Dummy  Dummy variable equals to one if the ownership type of 
the listed firm is not state-owned, zero otherwise 
CSMAR 
Weight  Account receivables to customer divided by supplier’s 
total account receivables. 
Hand 
collected 
Interfirm  Dummy variable equals to one if the supplier firm and 
customer firm is same, zero otherwise 
Hand 
collected 
 
                                                             
27
The net value of investing property started from 2007 and reports in balance sheet. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics. 
This table contains summary statistics of key variables in two samples: unbalanced sample and 
balance sample. All variables are calculated from the year 1999 to 2013. Mean difference between 
SOE and Non-SOE are shown in the last column.  ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  A. Whole Sample B. SOE C. Non-SOE 
 
Variables name Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Mean Diff 
Panel A: Unbalance Sample                    
AR/total sales 18566 0.255 0.321 10207 0.216 0.275 8359 0.303 0.364 -0.088 *** 
AP/total sales 18567 0.156 0.141 10207 0.148 0.124 8360 0.165 0.159 -0.017 *** 
Cash Reserves 18826 0.187 0.140 10299 0.175 0.125 8527 0.202 0.154 -0.027 *** 
Size 18826 21.437 1.168 10299 21.759 1.203 8527 21.049 0.996 0.709 *** 
Log(1+Age) 18824 2.349 0.523 10294 2.336 0.533 8530 2.365 0.511 -0.028 *** 
FI&IP/assets 18826 0.286 0.167 10299 0.310 0.174 8527 0.258 0.154 0.051 *** 
Net Profit 
Margin 18568 0.049 0.226 10208 0.060 0.171 8360 0.036 0.277 0.025 *** 
Total Sales 
growth  17292 0.207 0.499 9735 0.205 0.445 7557 0.210 0.560 -0.005 
 Net worth/assets 18826 0.519 0.239 10299 0.517 0.202 8527 0.522 0.278 -0.005 
 Total debt/assets 18755 0.199 0.155 10255 0.199 0.149 8500 0.199 0.162 0.000 
 Tobin Q 18583 2.450 1.682 10236 2.191 1.396 8347 2.768 1.930 -0.577 *** 
Panel B: Balance Sample                     
AR/total sales 10066 0.302 0.454 6437 0.240 0.349 3629 0.411 0.581 -0.171 *** 
AP/total sales 10067 0.166 0.186 6437 0.148 0.139 3630 0.198 0.245 -0.051 *** 
Cash Reserves 10197 0.154 0.112 6495 0.159 0.109 3702 0.145 0.116 0.014 *** 
Size 10197 21.377 1.173 6495 21.681 1.110 3702 20.845 1.089 0.836 *** 
Log(1+Age) 10200 2.469 0.512 6495 2.426 0.524 3705 2.545 0.480 -0.118 *** 
FI&IP/assets 10197 0.299 0.168 6495 0.310 0.170 3702 0.279 0.163 0.031 *** 
Net Profit 
Margin 10067 0.016 0.347 6437 0.048 0.223 3630 -0.039 0.491 0.087 *** 
Total Sales 
growth  9984 0.223 0.689 6383 0.215 0.580 3601 0.237 0.848 -0.022 
 Net worth/assets 10197 0.463 0.294 6495 0.501 0.212 3702 0.398 0.391 0.102 *** 
Total debt/assets 10168 0.225 0.164 6468 0.209 0.151 3700 0.252 0.182 -0.043 *** 
Tobin Q 10124 2.510 1.899 6484 2.215 1.477 3640 3.037 2.390 -0.822 *** 
Panel C: Pair Sample                     
Weight 3449 0.135 0.165 1901 0.135 0.164 1548 0.135 0.166 0.000 
 Interfirm 3450 0.171 0.377 1901 0.211 0.408 1549 0.122 0.327 0.089 *** 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Regression: Determinants of Trade Credit 
This table presents firm-year unbalance and balance data from year 1999 to 2013. The balance data 
require all firms have financial characteristics starting from 1999 to 2013. The dependent variables 
are accounts receivable, accounts payable scaled over total sales. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator 
equals to one if supplier firms is non-SOE. All specifications control for firms’ characteristics, 
which include size, age, tangibility, net profit margin sales growth, net worth, total debt and 
Tobin’s q. All specifications include industry and year fixed effect. The standard errors are 
clustered at firm and year level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  Unbalance Sample Balance Sample 
  (1)AR (2)AR (3)AP (4)AP (5)AR (6)AR (7)AP (8)AP 
non-SOE 0.063*** 0.087*** 0.012*** 0.019** 0.074*** 0.141*** 0.015* 0.028* 
 
(0.011) (0.020) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.033) (0.008) (0.016) 
Liquidity -0.521*** -0.450*** -0.143*** -0.124*** -0.776*** -0.601*** -0.208*** -0.174*** 
 
(0.103) (0.093) (0.022) (0.024) (0.156) (0.146) (0.037) (0.035) 
Liquidity* 
non-SOE  
-0.141** 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.455*** 
 
-0.089 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.073) 
Size -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(1+Age) -0.012 -0.012 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.023 0.026 -0.012 -0.011 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.025) (0.010) (0.009) 
FI&IP over 
assets 
-0.521*** -0.517*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.698*** -0.689*** -0.081*** -0.079*** 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.016) (0.016) (0.117) (0.116) (0.025) (0.025) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.295*** -0.293*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.321*** -0.315*** -0.116*** -0.115*** 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.015) (0.015) (0.059) (0.059) (0.018) (0.018) 
Sales growth 
-0.060*** -0.060*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.010** -0.010** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) 
Net worth 
over assets 
0.064* 0.069* -0.284*** -0.283*** 0.055 0.065 -0.253*** -0.251*** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.064) (0.063) (0.037) (0.036) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.159*** 0.166*** -0.220*** -0.218*** 0.221*** 0.238*** -0.190*** -0.186*** 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.025) (0.025) (0.068) (0.067) (0.037) (0.037) 
Tobin's q 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 1.638*** 1.621*** 0.730*** 0.726*** 1.756*** 1.715*** 0.817*** 0.809*** 
 
(0.143) (0.138) (0.058) (0.057) (0.262) (0.251) (0.102) (0.100) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17139 17139 17140 17140 9883 9883 9884 9884 
Adj 
R-squared 0.386 0.386 0.305 0.305 0.373 0.375 0.297 0.297 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Trade Credit: Factor Analysis 
This table presents firm-year unbalance and balance data from year 1999 to 2013. The balance data 
require all firms have financial characteristics starting from 1999 to 2013. The dependent variables 
are accounts receivable, accounts payable scaled over total sales. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator 
equals to one if supplier firms is non-SOE. High Sales Growth is a dummy equals to one if firm’s 
sales growth above median by each year. High GDP Growth is a dummy equals to one if firm’s 
geographic province’s GDP is above median by each year. All specifications include industry and 
year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Unbalance Sample Balance Sample 
  (1)AR (2)AR (3)AP (4)AP (5)AR (6)AR (7)AP (8)AP 
non-SOE 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.023** 0.017** 0.161*** 0.146*** 0.031 0.018 
 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) (0.039) (0.036) (0.020) (0.016) 
Liquidity -0.432*** -0.448*** -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.549*** -0.602*** -0.164*** -0.173*** 
 
(0.090) (0.093) (0.026) (0.024) (0.139) (0.146) (0.035) (0.035) 
Liquidity* 
non-SOE 
-0.162** -0.144** -0.055 -0.037 -0.390*** -0.453*** -0.080 -0.090 
(0.072) (0.069) (0.034) (0.027) (0.127) (0.132) (0.077) (0.073) 
High Sales 
Growth 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.020*** 
 
-0.046*** 
 
-0.025*** 
 (0.010) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.005) 
 High Sales 
Growth 
*non-SOE 
-0.029** 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.058*** 
 
-0.007 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.011) 
 High GDP 
Growth   
-0.008 
 
0.003 
 
-0.009 
 
0.002 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.005) 
High GDP 
Growth 
*non-SOE  
 
-0.013 
 
0.002 
 
-0.008 
 
0.019** 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.008) 
Size 
-0.029*** -0.034*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(1+Age) 
-0.021* -0.011 -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.013 0.025 -0.018* -0.010 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.025) (0.011) (0.010) 
PPE over 
assets 
-0.497*** -0.515*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.659*** -0.687*** -0.076*** -0.080*** 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.017) (0.016) (0.117) (0.115) (0.026) (0.024) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.297*** -0.293*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.320*** -0.315*** -0.114*** -0.114*** 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.016) (0.015) (0.058) (0.059) (0.018) (0.018) 
Sales growth 
-0.047*** -0.060*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.007* -0.010** 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) 
Net worth 
over assets 
0.058 0.068* -0.283*** -0.282*** 0.057 0.064 -0.248*** -0.252*** 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.061) (0.063) (0.036) (0.036) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.159*** 0.165*** -0.214*** -0.217*** 0.239*** 0.236*** -0.180*** -0.185*** 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.026) (0.025) (0.068) (0.067) (0.037) (0.037) 
Tobin's q 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Constant 
1.510*** 1.629*** 0.689*** 0.723*** 1.570*** 1.722*** 0.786*** 0.809*** 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.059) (0.058) (0.271) (0.248) (0.104) (0.100) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15285 17124 15286 17125 9190 9868 9191 9869 
Adj 
R-squared 0.391 0.387 0.316 0.305 0.383 0.375 0.308 0.298 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Account Receivable during Crisis  
This table presents firm-year unbalance data from year 1999 to 2013. The dependent variable is 
accounts receivable over total sales. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator equals to one if supplier 
firms is non-SOE. Crisis is an indicator that equals to one from year 2008 to 2009. All 
specifications control for firms’ characteristics, which include size, age, tangibility, net profit 
margin sales growth, net worth, total debt and Tobin’s q. All specifications include industry fixed 
effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Non-SOE  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.072*** 0.045*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Liquidity -0.610*** -0.649*** -0.611*** -0.503*** -0.651*** -0.543*** -0.504*** -0.545*** 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Crisis -0.102*** -0.150*** -0.077*** -0.102*** -0.126*** -0.150*** -0.078*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Crisis* 
Liquidity  
0.278*** 
  
0.286*** 0.276*** 
 
0.284*** 
 
(0.038) 
  
(0.038) (0.038) 
 
(0.038) 
Crisis* 
Non-SOE   
-0.057*** 
 
-0.060*** 
 
-0.057*** -0.060*** 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Liquidity* 
Non-SOE    
-0.208*** 
 
-0.207*** -0.208*** -0.207*** 
   
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Size -0.102*** -0.150*** -0.077*** -0.102*** -0.126*** -0.150*** -0.078*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Log(1+Age) -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FI&IP over 
assets 
-0.114*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.536*** -0.535*** -0.534*** -0.530*** -0.533*** -0.529*** -0.528*** -0.527*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Sales growth 
-0.290*** -0.291*** -0.290*** -0.287*** -0.291*** -0.288*** -0.287*** -0.288*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Net worth 
over assets 
-0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.094*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Tobin's q 
0.268*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.277*** 0.267*** 0.278*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 1.922*** 1.925*** 1.928*** 1.884*** 1.931*** 1.887*** 1.890*** 1.893*** 
 
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17139 17139 17139 17139 17139 17139 17139 17139 
R-squared 0.329 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.331 0.332 0.331 0.333 
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Account Receivable during Crisis: Robustness  
This table presents firm-year balanced data from year 1999 to 2013. The dependent variable is 
accounts receivable over total sales. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator equals to one if supplier 
firms is non-SOE. Crisis is an indicator that equals to one from year 2008 to 2009. All 
specifications control for firms’ characteristics, which include size, age, tangibility, net profit 
margin sales growth, net worth, total debt and Tobin’s q. All specifications include industry fixed 
effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level.  ***, ** and * indicate significance level at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
non-SOE 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.091*** 0.146*** 0.090*** 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Liquidity -0.801*** -0.874*** -0.804*** -0.618*** -0.871*** -0.691*** -0.622*** -0.689*** 
 
(0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) 
Crisis -0.116*** -0.198*** -0.074*** -0.117*** -0.154*** -0.200*** -0.075*** -0.155*** 
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.017) 
Crisis* 
Liquidity  
0.538*** 
  
0.497*** 0.539*** 
 
0.498*** 
 
(0.084) 
  
(0.080) (0.084) 
 
(0.081) 
Crisis* 
non-SOE   
-0.118*** 
 
-0.108*** 
 
-0.118*** -0.108*** 
  
(0.022) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.022) (0.021) 
Liquidity* 
non-SOE    
-0.472*** 
 
-0.473*** -0.471*** -0.472*** 
   
(0.132) 
 
(0.132) (0.131) (0.131) 
Size -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log(1+Age) -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.164*** -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
FI&IP over 
assets 
-0.715*** -0.714*** -0.713*** -0.706*** -0.712*** -0.705*** -0.704*** -0.703*** 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.319*** -0.320*** -0.319*** -0.313*** -0.319*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.313*** 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Sales growth 
-0.054*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Net worth 
over assets 
0.105** 0.106** 0.103** 0.115** 0.104** 0.116** 0.113** 0.114** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.337*** 0.338*** 0.329*** 0.354*** 0.331*** 0.356*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) 
Tobin's q 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 2.382*** 2.392*** 2.390*** 2.326*** 2.398*** 2.336*** 2.334*** 2.342*** 
 
(0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.191) (0.196) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9883 9883 9883 9883 9883 9883 9883 9883 
R-squared 0.336 0.338 0.338 0.339 0.34 0.341 0.341 0.343 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Account Payable during Crisis 
This table presents firm-year unbalance data from year 1999 to 2013. The dependent variable 
is accounts payable over total sales. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator equals to one if supplier 
firms is non-SOE. Crisis is an indicator that equals to one from year 2008 to 2009. All 
specifications control for firms’ characteristics, which include size, age, tangibility, net profit 
margin sales growth, net worth, total debt and Tobin’s q. All specifications include industry 
fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
non-SOE 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.020** 0.015*** 0.020** 0.021** 0.021** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Liquidity -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.126*** -0.143*** -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Crisis -0.011*** -0.010* -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.008 -0.010* -0.009*** -0.008 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Crisis* 
Liquidity  
-0.005 
  
-0.004 -0.006 
 
-0.005 
 
(0.025) 
  
(0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
Crisis* 
non-SOE   
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 -0.006 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Liquidity* 
non-SOE    
-0.033 
 
-0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
   
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Size 
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(1+Age) 
-0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FI&IP over 
assets 
-0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Sales growth 
-0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Net worth 
over assets 
-0.280*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.279*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Total debt 
over assets 
-0.224*** -0.224*** -0.224*** -0.222*** -0.224*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.223*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tobin's q 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 
0.588*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 0.582*** 0.588*** 0.582*** 0.582*** 0.582*** 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17140 17140 17140 17140 17140 17140 17140 17140 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Trade Credit Robustness for Supplier-Customer 
Relations  
This table presents firm-year unbalance data from year 1999 to 2013. The dependent variables are 
accounts receivables and accounts payables over total sales. Each observation represents a 
supplier-customer pair. Non-SOE Dummy is an indicator equals to one if supplier (customer) firms 
is non-SOE. Crisis is an indicator that equals to one from year 2008 to 2009. All specifications 
control for firms’ characteristics, which include size, age, tangibility, net profit margin sales 
growth, net worth, total debt and Tobin’s q. All specifications include supplier-customer pair effect 
and standard errors are clustered at supplier-customer pair. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1)AR (2)AR (3)AR (4)AP (5)AP (6)AP 
Crisis 
 
-0.055** -0.075** 
 
-0.010 -0.021 
 
 
(0.023) (0.032) 
 
(0.008) (0.013) 
Crisis* 
Cash Liq   
0.152 
  
0.085 
  
(0.90) 
  
(1.41) 
Crisis* 
non-SOE 
  
  
-0.061 
  
-0.024 
  
(-0.27) 
  
(-0.34) 
Cash Liq* 
Supplier 
non-SOE 
-0.166 -0.157 0.057 0.067 
(0.254)  (0.243) (0.076)  (0.077) 
Supplier variables 
   
  
Cash Liq 
-0.364 -0.440*** -0.378* -0.124* -0.090* -0.140* 
(0.225) (0.155) (0.214) (0.068) (0.050) (0.072) 
Size 
0.090 0.087 0.087 0.058** 0.058** 0.058** 
(1.57) (1.57) (1.58) (2.20) (2.20) (2.23) 
Log(1+Age) 
-0.484*** -0.482*** -0.479*** -0.064** -0.063** -0.062** 
(-3.45) (-3.46) (-3.45) (-2.10) (-2.09) (-2.06) 
FI&IP over 
assets 
-0.372** -0.369** -0.361** -0.091 -0.087 -0.088 
(-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.14) (-1.35) (-1.29) (-1.32) 
Net profit 
margin 
-0.212 -0.211 -0.211 -0.041 -0.040 -0.042 
(-1.25) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-0.78) (-0.77) (-0.80) 
Sales growth 
-0.036* -0.041** -0.042** -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
(-1.75) (-1.97) (-2.00) (-0.56) (-0.60) (-0.64) 
Net worth 
over assets 
0.127 0.113 0.120 -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.173*** 
(0.99) (0.88) (0.93) (-2.79) (-2.78) (-2.83) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.023 0.016 0.032 -0.092* -0.087 -0.090* 
(0.17) (0.13) (0.25) (-1.67) (-1.58) (-1.65) 
Tobin's q 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.39) (0.33) (0.34) (1.10) (1.04) (1.13) 
Customer variables 
   
  Weight -0.182 -0.188 -0.189 0.010 0.009 0.008 
129 
 
 
(-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.92) (0.33) (0.31) (0.27) 
Cash Liq -0.217 -0.111 -0.135 0.021 0.028 0.036 
 
(-1.05) (-0.51) (-0.63) (0.38) (0.48) (0.60) 
Size 0.090 0.078 0.076 0.005 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.35) (1.19) (1.17) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) 
FI&IP  over 
assets 
-0.313 -0.268 -0.270 0.028 0.037 0.033 
(-0.95) (-0.81) (-0.82) (0.35) (0.47) (0.42) 
Net profit 
margin 
0.070 0.048 0.043 0.042 0.037 0.036 
(0.34) (0.23) (0.21) (0.56) (0.50) (0.49) 
Sales growth -0.070* -0.084** -0.081** -0.030* -0.032* -0.032* 
 
(-1.94) (-2.29) (-2.17) (-1.83) (-1.90) (-1.83) 
Net worth 
over assets 
0.408** 0.396** 0.407** 0.026 0.024 0.029 
(2.13) (2.17) (2.21) (0.36) (0.34) (0.41) 
Total debt 
over assets 
0.118 0.134 0.125 -0.041 -0.040 -0.042 
(0.58) (0.67) (0.63) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
Constant -2.550* -2.204* -2.188* -0.920** -0.858** -0.853** 
 
(-1.90) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-2.32) (-2.16) (-2.17) 
Pair Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2457 2457 2457 2457 2457 2457 
R-squared 0.747 0.751 0.752 0.79 0.79 0.791 
 
 
 
